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Abstract

The large number of streaming intrusion alerts make it challenging for security analysts to
quickly identify attack patterns. This is especially difficult since critical alerts often occur too
rarely for traditional pattern mining algorithms to be effective. Recognizing the attack speed as
an inherent indicator of differing cyber attacks, this work aggregates alerts into attack episodes
that have distinct attack speeds, and finds attack actions regularly co-occurring within the
same episode. This enables a novel use of the constrained SPADE temporal pattern mining
algorithm to extract consistent co-occurrences of alert signatures that are indicative of attack
actions that follow each other. The proposed Rare yet Co-occurring Attack action Discovery
(R-CAD) system extracts not only the co-occurring patterns but also the temporal characteristics of the co-occurrences, giving the ‘strong rules’ indicative of critical and repeated attack
behaviors. Through the use of a real-world dataset, we demonstrate that R-CAD helps reduce
the overwhelming volume and variety of intrusion alerts to a manageable set of co-occurring
strong rules. We show specific rules that reveal how critical attack actions follow one another
and in what attack speed.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
As systems continue to move into the digital realm and the Internet of Things (IoT) grows ever
larger, the ramifications of cyberattacks will spread wider than ever [1]. Malware infecting a
single system can propagate through an entire network, in some cases crippling a company’s
infrastructure as seen with recent ransomware attacks, such as WannaCry and Bad Rabbit.
Unsuspecting users deceived by phishing e-mails or tricked into visiting malicious URLs designed
to imitate real web sites in an attempt to gather user authentication information also pose a
threat to institutions. Such attacks are carried out almost every day with a high likelihood of a
target experiencing multiple attacks over the course of a day. The question is no longer whether
an enterprise will be the target of an attack, but when, and how intense the attack activity will
be.
Cyber defense analysts commonly utilize intrusion detection systems (IDSs) to process network
traffic. In practice the number of IDS alerts generated within a network is overwhelming. An
analyst cannot process them in a reasonable amount of time. IDS alert signatures attempt to
describe attacker actions, but there are many unique, usually vague, signatures.
Analysts are most concerned with a small number of “critical” signatures that detail severe
malicious action against a network such as data loss or injection. These critical alerts occur
very infrequently, but are of the highest importance and interest to analysts. Once detected
analysts will attempt to trace an attacker’s actions to previous alerts. This is no easy task as it
is not easy to determine which alerts are correlated. Existing approaches require a priori expert
knowledge, or classify a number of alert attributes using extensive training sets. There is no
work focused on parsing and capturing individual attacker actions from alert streams.
This work begins by presenting a deep analysis of the temporal characteristics of cyber events.
The findings of that exploration motivated the Concept Learning for Intrusion Event Aggrega1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

2

tion in Realtime (CLEAR) system which aggregates cyber alerts in a meaningful way based on
their temporal arrival characteristics in real time and with no training data [65]. Building upon
this, the Rare yet Co-occurring Attack action Discovery (R-CAD) system is presented which
leverages CLEAR to generate attack episodes. Pattern mining is then applied to episodes to
extract statistically meaningful and frequent signature relationships between rare critical signatures.
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows:

1. Exploration into the temporal characteristics of cyber events. ARIMA modeling of event
counts produces improved forecasting with clear weekly seasonality. Recent attack volume
can also be used as a predictor both in forecasting and classification of future activity
levels.
2. Development of a novel CLEAR system that continually learns to aggregate alerts in near
real-time by statistically matching the distribution of arrival times to a learned ‘concept.’
Performance improvements of CLEAR over the baseline approach, TSSD-EWMA, in terms
of concept uniqueness and tightness, are demonstrated using a real-world cyber intrusion
alert dataset.
3. A novel R-CAD system which extracts “strong” relationships between signatures describing both co-occurrence and temporal separation. Two real world datasets are used with
similar relationships found across them. R-CAD produces meaningful signature relationships occurring with consistent timing.
4. A set of unique metrics to characterize, prioritize and visualize signature relationships to
an analyst.

1.1

The Overwhelming Cyber Threat

Cyber attacks against organizations are occurring with increasing regularity. Thanks to the
Internet of Things (IoT) there has been a transition to cloud infrastructures and data digitization. While beneficial these systems also introduce risk as they are prime targets for cyber
criminals. The cost of a successful breach can be high for a corporation [1]. Cyber defense
analysts attempt to defend and protect a network and the data contained within it from attack.
In many ways cyber defense can be very reactive. Vulnerabilities are often found long after
their deployment and attack vectors are constantly changing. IDS systems alert analysts to
potentially malicious behavior, but even this can be seen as reactive rather than preventative.
It is naive to think that one could perfectly predict in advance exact attack actions, especially
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those not seen prior. However, there is still value to an analyst in knowing expected trends in
attack intensity and actions. Having a stronger confidence in what attackers may deploy can
assist analysts in effectively configuring their network defenses to stop malicious traffic at the
edge of the network.
No defense is perfect, and unfortunately malicious emails, URLs and malware frequently are
able to enter into a network. These types of attacks are easy to deploy and require only a
single person to be unaware, opening a malicious attachment or visiting a spoofed site. In
networks with a high number of users the likelihood that one of these attacks succeeding after
penetrating the network increases due to the number of potential users. While the threat of
attack is constant, the intensity can vary significantly day by day. Figure 1.1 shows the daily
counts of confirmed cyber events against a public facing corporation. There are a significant
number of spikes in intensity during various days. Can these counts be modeled? Can the spikes
be anticipated?

Figure 1.1: Daily count of cyber events against a target
Confirming cyber events and creating datasets such as that shown in Figure 1.1 unfortunately
have high overhead. Human confirmation and manual analysis of network traffic and device
activity is required. This makes it unlikely that a SOC will have up to the minute data. Cyber
analysts operating in security operation centers (SOCs) commonly deploy IDSs to alert them
of potentially malicious traffic in real time. IDS is generally used as a catch all term for various
systems which monitor network traffic and raise alerts when suspicious behavior is detected.
Alerts are configured to trigger based on specific signatures defined by the rule defining a
particular alert. The most commonly deployed type of IDS is a network-based one. This work
is focused on alerts generated by network-based IDS Suricata [53], which is usually configured
to process traffic as it enters into an internal network. Unlike event counts, IDS alerts are
generated autonomously but still are indicative of attacker actions.
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While necessary for adequate network defense IDSs bring with them challenges, namely an
overwhelming number of alerts and a lack of clear relationship between various alert signatures.
It is common for an IDS to generate hundreds of thousands, if not millions of alerts per day.
Most rules are fairly general, usually not limiting which IP addresses and ports are considered.
Further, most rule signatures are short, making up only a part of a packet’s payload. It is
very easy for normal traffic to trigger an alert, an unfortunate side effect of IDS configuration.
Stricter rules can be put in place but this increases the likelihood that malicious traffic is missed.
Analysts can improve alert accuracy and reduce the number of false positives, but this will not
reduce the total number of alerts significantly. It is unreasonable to assume that even a large
team of analysts would be able to manually process this high number of alerts in a reasonable
amount of time.
Alert aggregation methods attempt to reduce the overall number of alerts by grouping similar
alerts together. In its simplest form, alert aggregation groups alerts with matching signatures
and similar timestamps together [25]. The most common alerts generated by IDS are scan and
brute force access attempts. Single “actions” of these approaches will generate many alerts
in a very short period of time due to ongoing activity or alerts being generated by multiple
sensors [24]. Groups of similar alerts were denoted as “hyper alerts” in [72] where clustering
techniques were used to gather similar alerts occurring in near temporal proximity. Time series
methodologies have also been applied to the stream of alerts for aggregation, collecting the
counts of alerts with the same signature in a certain time window [59].
Reducing the overall number of alerts does nothing to give analysts deeper insights into attack
actions and motivations. Frequent alerts such as scanning and brute force attacks are unfortunately common and expected in any public facing network. Analysts are more concerned
with alerts indicating potential breaches in their network. These alerts are inherently very rare
making up an extremely small portion of the alerts generated by the IDS. Further analysts are
interested in understanding the overall attacker actions surrounded these rare “critical” alerts.
Are there any patterns in the alerts generated by the critical action linking them to other, less
critical alerts? After a critical action, what is the next step the attacker will take? It is difficult
to answer these questions. Attack methods evolve and change over time and may differ from
network to network. It is difficult to “know” which alerts are related to one another. To the
author’s knowledge there is no publicly available dataset of IDS alerts with labels denoting the
individual attacker action which generated the alert. This makes for a difficult problem, which
alerts are related to one another? Which ones are borne from the same attacker actions?
Alert correlation methods aim to define and extract alert relationships, usually leveraging external information, templates, and expert knowledge. A number of studies have been conducted
describing the various types of alert correlation approaches [17, 32, 47, 48]. In general there are
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three overarching types of alert correlation: similarity based, knowledge-based, and statisticsbased [47]. Similarity based approaches leverage rule sets to define relationships between signatures. Initially these were user defined relationships built on expert knowledge [56] however
more recent work employ machine learning techniques [13,73] and artificial neural networks [67]
to extract feature relationships. Knowledge based approaches leverage expert knowledge [46]
to generate attack graphs of attack scenarios, or attempt to extract them from historic attack
data [73]. Statistics based approaches aim to minimize the need for external knowledge, focusing
instead on the statistics of the alerts themselves.
Little focus has been given to the temporal trends and relationships present in cyber datasets.
Aggregation and correlation methods use time windows for processing alerts, and overall alert
frequencies have been used to determine relationships, however to the author’s knowledge no
work has focused specifically on extracting the temporal patterns present in cyber datasets and
how that may be indicative of attack actions and signature patterns and relationships.

1.2

Capturing Temporal Cyber Trends

Successful cyber events occur regularly against various corporations and public facing networks.
The site Hackmageddon [40] aggregates cyber event statistics as they occur world wide. These
are just a fraction of the total events experienced by individual entities. The threat of attack
is constant, and while many attempts may not be successful attempts are always being made.
Cyber events such as malicious E-mails making it through filters, or malicious links leading to
malware or spoofed networks phishing for credentials can be threats when carried out against
a corporate entity. While the threat is constant, the intensity of attacks is not. Ebbs and flows
in event counts occur, suggesting that trends in activity exist.
Counts of alerts have been used in alert aggregation [59] and for traffic forecasting [70]. To the
author’s knowledge, we are the first to apply time series modeling to the counts of cyber events
experienced by a target entity [62, 63, 64]. The findings made in initial exploratory research
provide the foundation to the later chapters of this work. Leveraging a curated dataset of cyber
events against two real world entities in unique sectors, it was found that there are temporal
trends present which can be modeled with TS forecasting.
When an entity takes action against a well defended network, those actions will likely generate
IDS alerts. This alert generation is intrinsically tied to the actions the time at which they
were taken. Most malicious operations require many actions taken by an attacker. Since
multiple actions are expected and given that each action will generate IDS alerts it is intuitive
to expect that trends in activity could be indicative toward future behavior. This concept can
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be abstracted to the cyber event level as well. A single successful cyber event is made up of
many actions, each generating a number of IDS alerts. Therefore temporal relationships found
at the event level should also in same way present between the alerts generated by that event.
When a single action is taken, an “episode” of alerts will be generated from it. These alerts
may not share the same signature, but they will share similar temporal patterns, which should
cease when the action itself does. Building off of alert aggregation techniques, can aggregation
be done in such a way that the grouped alerts are those generated by a single attack action?
Concept drift [34] is a phenomena where the relationships found and modeled change over time.
This type of behavior is very common in human generated network traffic [57] as interest in
topics and trends shift over time. Similarly, attacker’s actions will change over time and with
the configuration of a network. While concept drift is normally associated with classification
schemes it has been applied to univariate data streams as well [9]. If IDS alerts originating
from unique IPs are treated as an event driven data stream, concept drift detection approaches
would be applicable. Scanning may be done frequently, but a more directed attack may be
slower, enacted across multiple actions. Leveraging the idea of concept drift and applying it
to IDS alerts helps to discover the changes in alert generation. These changes can be used in
aggregation as the end of actions. Aggregating alerts in this way provides episodes of alerts
which were likely borne from the same attacker action.
The main motivation of this work is to provide insights to cyber analysts about the statistically
significant signature patterns and relationships present pertaining to the rare “critical” alerts
that they are most concerned with understanding. Temporally driven aggregation provides
groups of alerts borne from unique actions, but further analysis is needed to extract any patterns
that can be found within. Sequential pattern mining approaches process temporally ordered
events to find frequent and meaningful patterns within. Application of pattern mining to cyber
alerts has been minimally explored however it can incur high overheads with large datasets [26].
Given that analysts are interested in patterns containing inherently infrequent signatures, this
overhead increases significantly. To apply such a method to IDS alerts would require special
consideration in data preparation.
Pattern mining algorithms produce groups of frequent sequences, but this does not tell the
full story. Without additional metrics tailored to the problem these sequences do not truly
provide insights. For example, shoppers at a grocery store may frequently buy milk and cereal
together (correlated purchase) while others may also frequently purchase grapes and frozen
pizza together. Frequency does not inherently imply correlated occurrence. In this work,
focused metrics are presented which provide analysts information they need to understand how
statistically significant the patterns found are. Such metrics ensure that analysts are presented
with relationships that will help them in their defense of a network.
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Summary of Work

To solve the issue of quickly collecting attack actions from IDS alert streams and extracting
meaningful relationships between rare “critical” signatures to present to a SOC analyst, the
Rare yet Co-occurring Attack action Discovery (R-CAD) system is presented. R-CAD aims
to overcome the challenges presented by the lack of well labeled IDS alert datasets, building
relationships based solely on the occurrence statistics of alerts within a network. R-CAD ingests IP based streams of IDS alerts as they are generated and processes them using Concept
Learning for Intrusion Event Aggregation in Realtime (CLEAR) [65] to capture episodes of
alerts. CLEAR utilizes concept drift techniques and a novel concept learning engine which
produces significantly less variant and more statistically unique concepts compared to similar
approaches. Episodes are then merged across streams to create network wide “attack speeds”
made up of temporally similar episodes from individual streams. Sequence databases (SDBs)
are then constructed in a constrained manor to significantly reduce overhead of pattern mining.
Association rules produced by pattern mining are then parsed using a number of statistical
metrics measured for each potential rule. “Strong” rules, or those highlighting statistically significant co-occurrence relationships within an attack speed are then presented to an analyst.
Figure 4.1 shows the R-CAD architecture.

Figure 1.2: Flowchart of IDS Alerts Through R-CAD and CLEAR Architecture
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes initial exploratory research
of the temporal characteristics of cyber events. Evidence of temporal correlations across cyber
attacks is found. Attack counts can be effectively modeled using ARIMA forecasting. It was
also found that patterns were present based on the time of day and day of the week. The
findings of this chapter indicate that cyber attacks, and by extension IDS alerts, have temporal
correlation to one another. Chapter 3 introduces and details the CLEAR system for efficient
alert aggregation and concept learning. CLEAR expands upon drift detection approaches,
modifying its design to focus on alert aggregation. Groups of successive temporally near alerts
exhibiting similar arrival patterns are captured to produce alert aggregates. Unlike traditional
aggregation methods which simply group similar alerts, CLEAR’s aggregates inherently relate
unique alerts based on their arrival patterns. Concepts learned by CLEAR are more invariant
and statistically unique from one another compared to baseline methods. Chapter 4 describes
the R-CAD system and presents the relationships found for critical signatures when applied
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to the CPTC 2018 alert dataset as well as a week of IDS alerts collected in a real world SOC
operation. R-CAD leverages CLEAR to sequence IDS alerts for use in pattern mining. It
utilizes a novel approach to extract “strong” signature relationships based on co-occurrence
and temporal separation. With a number of unique metrics tailored to the needs of analysts,
potential association rules can be prioritized and visualized. Chapter 5 concludes this work and
provides discussion of potential future work.

1.3.1

Publications

This work has produced a number of publications which are listed below, ordered by chapter.
• Chapter 2
1. G. Werner, S. Yang, and K. McConky. “Leveraging intra-day temporal variations
to predict daily cyberattack activity.” In proceedings of 2018 IEEE International
Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI ’18), Miami, FL, USA
2. G. Werner, A. Okutan, S. Yang, and K. McConky. “Forecasting cyberattacks as time
series with different aggregation granularity.” In proceedings of 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST ’18), Woburn, MA,
USA
3. G. Werner, S. Yang, and K. McConky. “Time series forecasting of cyber attack
intensity.” In Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference on Cyber and Information
Security Research, (CISRC ’17), Oak Ridge, TN, USA
• Chapter 3
1. G. Werner, S. Yang, and K. McConky. “Near real-time intrusion alert aggregation
using concept-based learning.” In Proceedings of the 18th ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers (CF ’21), Virtual
• Chapter 4
1. G. Werner and S. Yang. “Discovery of Rare yet Co-occurring Actions with Temporal
Characteristics in Episodic Cyberattack Streams.” To be published in July 2022 in
Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Computer Communications and
Networks (ICCCN 2022), Virtual.
2. G. Werner and S. Yang. “Clear-road: Extraction of temporally co-occurring yet rare
critical alerts.” In Proceedings of the Conference on Applied Machine Learning for
Information Security (CAMLIS ’21), Arlington, VA, USA

Chapter 2

Investigating Temporal
Characteristics of Cyber Events
The need for new and novel cyber attack prevention mechanisms grows with the Internet of
Things (IoT). Malicious parties constantly attempt to breach the networks and systems of
public facing organizations. Intrusion detection systems are used to monitor and parse network
traffic to detect malicious attacks. Intrusion detection systems are effective and necessary in
alerting an analyst of potentially malicious traffic [68] however they provide minimal prevention
capabilities. Before it can be processed and detected, malicious traffic must enter the target’s
network. Analysts are interested in understanding the temporal relationships between and
within attacker actions. This interest raises a unique question not investigated much in research,
are there temporal relationships across attacker actions? Can historic attack intensity indicate
future behavior? This chapter aims to better understand the temporal characteristics of cyber
events and explore the applicability of forecasting and classification methods on future attack
intensity. Through this exploration a deeper understanding of the temporal characteristics of
cyber events can be gained.
Given the regularity of attacks experienced by specific targets, temporal patterns can be extracted and modeled from historical incident intensity measurements [63]. Focusing on only the
dataset of previous attacks experienced by a target removes the need for external data collection
while still providing accurate forecasts of a future day’s attack volume thanks to the temporal
correlations exhibited between attack counts. Forecasting attack data is challenging given the
variability in adversary motivations and constantly evolving attack vectors. Intra-day trends
can be present in the dataset that could improve model accuracy through a smaller measurement period 𝜏. Similarly, a day may be too short a period when an attack method exhibits
weekly or multi-day seasonality.
9
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Correlation has been found in the time series (TS) of daily cyberattack counts [63], and basic
forecasting methods have been shown capable of modeling daily incident counts [4]. Intuitively,
a future day’s attack volume would be best forecast using the time series (TS) constructed with
daily attack measurements. However, this hypothesis may be challenged by exploring intra-day
temporal variations in attack intensity. Cyberattack occurrence frequency can fluctuate over
the course of a day. By using daily counts to construct a forecasting model, intra-day trends are
overlooked, which could weaken the overall strength of the model. Using a shorter measurement
period to construct a time series allows the model to account for intra-day variations and could
increase forecast accuracy. A forecasting model predicts a value for the next period of time with
length 𝜏 hours; these forecasts can then be aggregated to produce a single forecast for a larger,
in this case daily, time window Δ. Model accuracy can be further strengthened through the
addition of a regressor component. Dataset analysis reveals “hot spots,” periods of time during
the week where a significantly higher or lower number of attack occurrences are experienced.
Capturing this phenomena through a regressor component added to ARIMA can help reduce
the smoothing and lagging inherent in the standard model.
Bayesian networks (BN) are directed acyclic graphical models which could represent the probabilistic relationships among a set of attributes and help to determine the [37, 39] suggests that
BN can be leveraged to classify future cyberattack behavior using unconventional signals from
a variety of open data sources. Historic attack events are aggregated using various temporal
windows and used as signals (attributes) in a BN model to predict future attack intensities. The
significance of different aggregation periods were analyzed based on the graph dependencies and
conditional probability tables.
Qualitative representations of intensity can provide a potential target with more information
to better detect and prevent malicious traffic from infiltrating their networks and systems.
Furthermore, when ignoring outliers average daily attack counts are small for most attack types
and targets. In these cases, a daily binary prediction denoting whether or not at least one
attack will occur could prove sufficiently valuable to a target. Various methods for interpreting
ARIMA forecasts to generate such decisions are explored in this work. Binary and qualitative
representation are also analyzed with a BN approach and the results are compared with the
ARIMA methods. This paper provides evidence that the correlations found by the BN between
various aggregation periods correspond to those that see the best accuracy improvement with
ARIMA. Exploring ARIMA and BN approaches to attack prediction provide deeper insight into
their ability to model future incidents. Improvement in forecasting strength over naive methods
show that there is potential for further improvements in modeling and predicting cyber attacks.
This work investigates an event dataset of malicious incidents experienced by two target organizations over two years curated by cyber analysts. Such a focused dataset allows for a more
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realistic environment to better analyze and understand the temporal characteristics of varying attack types carried out against specific targets compared to a compiled list of publicly
known attacks levied against many individuals, like Hackmageddon [40]. In this chapter, various forecasting and classification approaches are applied to the dataset of cyber events. Models
and attributes are focused on the temporal characteristics of cyber events to provide deeper
understanding of occurrence relationships between attacks.

2.1

Related Work

Forecasting of cyber incidents is an emerging field of study in literature which aims to predict
future attack occurrences using historical attack patterns and leading indicators. This deviates
from traditional intrusion detection approaches, which focus on analyzing network traffic to alert
of an attack that is currently being levied [18]. Forecasting models such as the Auto Regressive
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) has been applied to network traffic [49] for prediction of
future bandwidth needs. Traffic forecasting can be integrated into intrusion detection systems
[2] to classify potential future attacks based on traffic forecasts and attack models like those
constructed in [70].
Application of forecasting models in predicting future cyber events has been minimally explored
[20, 39] as well as some classification methods, such as Bayesian networks [37, 39]. Traditional
forecasting methods like ARIMA [14] have been shown to provide accurate results on large
malware datasets [4] and a collection of attacks curated by the Hackmageddon website [63].
Both examples use datasets that span multiple targets, looking at trends independent of the
sector or any specific entity.
Most work in the area of forecasting events is based on publicly available attack sets spanning
various targets, analyzing general trends rather than providing focused insight to a specific
target. Such datasets are incomplete as they rely on the public reporting of events and usually
contain only major or newsworthy breaches. The dataset used in this work was curated by a
single working group, ensuring that there was a consistent standard for attack classification.
Curated datasets allow for more accurate modeling of attacks as shown in [4] where Bayesian
State Space and Markov models were able to predict weekly malware event counts effectively.
This work focuses on daily cyberattack prediction using only historical event data, something
that has seen very little investigation in literature. Cyberattacks exhibit intra-day patterns
that are lost when looking only at daily counts, so daily predictions are made using forecasts
for periods of time less than 24 hours. Intra-day forecasts have been shown to be effective in
modeling daily trends of currency volatility [30]. ARIMA forecasting models are used to predict
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cyber incidents before they occur, without using signals gathered from an internal network as is
done in intrusion detection [49]. Attributes of a cyber incident such as its method, target and
occurrence time exhibit temporal correlations and can be modeled. Differences in event counts
and occurrence patterns between targets indicate that unique models are required for each
target across the same attack type [64]. ARIMA models are not best equipped to accurately
forecast spikes [4] but can be supplemented to provide better predictions of spikes to improve
forecasts [71]. Very little focus has been given towards analyzing the effectiveness of forecasting
cyber event data. Accurate predictive models can alert a target to cyber incidents before they
happen giving them time to prevent malicious traffic from even entering an internal network.

2.2

Measuring Attack Counts Over Time

Consider the set of cyber incidents against target 𝑘 of type 𝑗 occurring during time interval 𝑖
as 𝐶𝑖, 𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑐 1 , 𝑐 2 , ...𝑐 𝑛 . The count of attacks experienced during a time interval can be denoted
as 𝑦 𝑖, 𝑗,𝑘 . With attacks occurring frequently over time temporal relationships can be modeled
to forecast future expected volume. As incident counts are measured over many time periods
of fixed length 𝜏 hours, a time series can be constructed 𝑌 𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑦 1, 𝑗,𝑘 , 𝑦 2, 𝑗,𝑘 , ..., 𝑦 𝑛, 𝑗,𝑘 where
𝑦 𝑖, 𝑗,𝑘 = 𝐶𝑖, 𝑗,𝑘 and 𝑖 is a time interval of length 𝜏 hours beginning at time 𝑖 · 𝜏. If successive
incident counts exhibit correlation, future attack volumes can be forecast using an ARIMA
model. Figure 2.1 shows the correlation for daily counts of malicious E-mail attacks carried out
against an institution. Correlation is significant between current and historic measurements,
indicating that this data is well suited to being modeled and forecasted.

Figure 2.1: ACF plot of Daily E-mail Attacks Against Target 2
A useful forecast for a target’s security officers is the number of attacks of a specific type that
will occur over the next day (𝜏 = 24 hours) [63]. This however may not maximize forecasting
accuracy for all targets and methods as there are intra-day temporal relationships in event
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occurrences. It is reasonable to assume that most individual attackers would be active for a
portion of the day. It is unreasonable to expect a person to be actively attacking twenty four
hours a day, seven days a week. This theory is validated through analysis of attack times by
hour of the day and day of the week as shown in figure 2.2. All hours are based on Greenwich
mean time (GMT) and may not represent the local time of attack.

Figure 2.2: Heatmap of Malware Attack Counts Against Target 1 (a) and E-Mail Attack Counts
Against Target 2 (b) for each hour (UTC) of each day of the week. Darker boxes denote higher
intensity
Over one third of all malware attacks against target 1 occur on Tuesdays; of those attacks, 73
percent occur within a ten hour range of time. Other configurations, such as malicious E-mail
attacks against target 2 shown in figure 2.2(b) also show incident volume concentrated around
certain hours of the day, suggesting that time series constructed with smaller measurement
periods 𝜏 < 24 could be better modeled by ARIMA to produce more accurate intensity forecasts.
Correlation coefficients can be used to determine the critical lags of a time series. A critical lag is
a previous measurement that shows significant correlation to the current measurement. ARIMA
models are built around such critical lags, giving a higher weight to recent measurements that are
more strongly correlated. For each target and attack type, the autocorrelation function (ACF)
and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) coefficients were measured to find the critical lags
of the time series generated over varying measurement periods 𝜏 = 4, 8, 12, and 24. The 𝜏 values
that resulted in the highest number of recent critical lags are listed in table 2.1.
In all but one case, a time series with measurement period 𝜏 of 8 or 12 hours results in strong
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Table 2.1: Ideal 𝜏 Based on Critical Lags from ACF and PACF
Tgt. Method 𝜏 ACF 𝜏 PACF
1

Malware

8

8

1

URL

8

12

1

E-Mail

12

8

2

Malware

8

12

2

URL

12

24

2

E-Mail

8

8

correlations in intra-day attack counts that are lost when 𝜏 = 24. Higher correlations within a
series usually leads to a more accurate model [14], so ARIMA forecasts of incident volume for
smaller 𝜏 should be more accurate. It follows then that the aggregation of forecasts for 𝜏 < 24
should be more accurate than a single prediction when 𝜏 = 24
While correlation can be indicative towards the forecastability of a time series it is not guaranteed. In the case of E-mail attacks against Target 1, 13% of days with attacks see more than
10 incidents; these are extreme outliers considering an average of 2.15 attacks on other days
with incidents. Outliers such as these will cause errors to propagate to future forecasts, limiting
performance.

2.3
2.3.1

Forecasting Future Attack Intensity
ARIMA Forecasting Models

ARIMA predictions are based on temporal correlations of the time series and the windowed
mean of recent measurements. A model combines an autoregressive 𝐴𝑅( 𝑝) process made up of
exponentially decreasing weights 𝜙𝑖 applied to the 𝑝 most recent time series measurements and
a moving average 𝑀 𝐴(𝑞) of the 𝑞 most recent weighted 𝜃 𝑖 prediction errors 𝑒 and the series
mean 𝜇. A forecast for time 𝑡 is made at the end of the preceding measurement period 𝑡 − 𝜏 and
is denoted by 𝑦ˆ𝑡 (𝑡 −𝜏). The AR and MA functions can be combined to generate the ARMA( 𝑝, 𝑞)
model for forecasting a future time series value 𝑦ˆ𝑡+1 :

𝐴𝑅𝑀 𝐴( 𝑝, 𝑞) = 𝜇 + 𝜖 +

𝑝
∑︁
𝑖=1

𝜙𝑖 𝑦 𝑡−𝑖 −

𝑞
∑︁

𝜃 𝑖 𝑒 𝑡−𝑖

(2.1)

𝑖=1

with 𝜖 being random noise. For the ARMA process to be effective it must be generated over a
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stationary time series. If the data is non-stationary differencing must first occur. A differenced
time series 𝑌 ′ (𝑛) is constructed by subtracting successive measurements such that 𝑦 𝑡′ = 𝑦 𝑡 − 𝑦 𝑡−1 .
Differencing is done 𝑑 times to produce stationary data, leading to the ARIMA(𝑝, 𝑑, 𝑞) model.

2.3.2

Prediction Aggregation

Prediction aggregation may strengthen the ARIMA model’s capabilities. Forecasting is inherently reactionary as predictions are made using recent measurements. A finer grained 𝜏 can give
better insight into temporal trends of a series measured over larger periods of time Δ. A count
measurement over aggregation period Δ is made up of 𝑔 forecasts made at regular 𝜏 intervals
Í
such that 𝑔 = Δ𝜏 and the aggregated count 𝑥 𝑖, 𝑗,𝑘 = 𝑖+Δ
𝑏=𝑖 𝑦 𝑏, 𝑗,𝑘 . The sum of all 𝑔 measurements
made using 𝜏 is equivalent to the count of incidents during the time period Δ. It follows that
Í
ˆ𝑏 (𝑏 − 𝜏) allowing for a direct
predictions should exhibit similar behavior, 𝑥ˆ𝑡 (𝑡 − Δ) = 𝑡+Δ
𝑏=𝑡 𝑦
accuracy comparison across varying 𝜏. Aggregated predictions can be configured as 𝐴𝐺 (𝜏, Δ).
Different attack methods can exhibit varying temporal patterns leading to a specific 𝜏 that
best models attack intensity over Δ. Cyber incidents have unique temporal qualities, occurring
within fixed times rather than evenly throughout a day. Using 𝜏 = 24 hours to forecast a future
day’s attacks does not capture these intra-day trends. Constructing a daily forecast Δ = 24
from a time series with measurement period 𝜏 = 8 allows for a model with greater insight into
intra-day attack trends and can provide increased accuracy.

2.3.3

ARIMA With Intensity-based Regressors

ARIMA models can be strengthened by the inclusion of a regressor series, a signal that is
explanatory towards trends in the series being forecast. Temporal characteristics of a series can
be used as a regressor vector, indicating spikes or dips in incident intensity based on historic
patterns. These ”hot-spots” occur with enough regularity at the same general time period of
each week that they are explanatory of intensity. Figure 2.2(a) shows the heat map of attack
counts during each hour and day of the week for malware incidents carried out against Target 1.
A cursory investigation shows a disproportionate number of attacks seem to occur on Tuesdays.
This period of time can be used as a regressor for Δ <= 24ℎ𝑟 𝑠 to better predict incident intensity.
Discerning temporal patterns visually is rarely a trivial task as figure 2.2(b) shows. Target 2
experiences E-Mail attacks at regular intervals throughout the week with no obvious concentration on particular days or time periods. Broadly applying regressors based on intuition can
hinder their effectiveness and should be avoided. Periods of intensity can instead be collected
systematically to produce a regressor more likely to provide accurate predictions.
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Consider the hourly heatmap 𝐻 (1), 𝐻 = {ℎ0 , ℎ1 , ..., ℎ167 } where ℎ𝑖 is the count of incidents
during the 𝑖𝑡ℎ hour of the week. Measurement period 𝜏 increases the temporal range of each
ℎ𝑖 and reduces the overall length of 𝐻 such that 𝐻 (𝜏) = {ℎ0 , ℎ1 , ..., ℎ𝑊 | 𝑊 =

168
𝜏 }.

The largest

ℎ𝑖 ∈ 𝐻 (𝜏) indicate the periods of time in which the most incidents occur for a particular attack
type and Target. A regressor vector can be applied to an ARIMA model to indicate that a
specific measurement period will exhibit non standard behavior. A model can have multiple
regressors if there are more than one explanatory variables. Binary vectors corresponding to
the weekly measurement periods 𝐻 (𝜏) can indicate abnormally high or low attack occurrence
rates and improve forecasts. Regressor variables are determined using the forward selection
method [8] which analyzes all possible weekly measurement periods ℎ𝑖 , determining which show
adequate correlation to be used as explanatory variables for forecasting.

2.3.4

Qualitative Forecasting

Attack intensity is forecast using ARIMA by generating a model over the time series of incident
counts using measurement period 𝜏. Model accuracy is commonly measured with the mean
square error (MSE). MSE represents the average squared forecast error as defined in (2.2). An
ARIMA model attempts to define the temporal patterns and behavior of a time series based
on correlations found within the data. If there is nothing that can be modeled, then ARIMA
produces the series mean. To measure the effectiveness of the ARIMA models, forecast errors
are compared to the MSE when using the series mean as a prediction.

𝑛

1 ∑︁
(𝑥 𝑖 − 𝑥ˆ𝑖 ) 2
𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
𝑛 𝑖=1

(2.2)

While MSE can measure the raw forecasting improvement of ARIMA, more robust metrics are
needed to provide analysts valuable insight into activity. ARIMA forecasting models predict a
continuous value in a scenario where all measurements will be integers. Further, an analyst is
likely not concerned with knowing the exact number of attacks; they will take the same actions
to prevent 10 malicious e-mails as they would 12. To account for this a qualitative bucketing
approach applied to intensity predictions made with ARIMA is proposed. For this work 4
categories are used to categorize a forecast: zero, low, average and high activity. Categories
were bound based on the quartiles of the range of attack counts, with average representing
counts falling within the first and third quartile. Each category represents a range of attacks
generated from historical data in 𝑋 𝑗𝑘 (𝑛). Using each method’s historical data against a specific
target to determine ranges for each bucket allows for results that are specific to the attack under
consideration and give a better context to the intensity forecast.
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Although a ”normal” day sees varying incident counts depending on attack type, some methods
either see no volume or only one attack for a large portion of the days recorded. Providing
accurate predictions for the binary series 𝑌 𝑗𝑘 (𝑛) can in some cases prove more valuable. To be
considered effective, the model should be able to more accurately predict 𝑦ˆ𝑡+1 than a weighted
prediction based on the historical occurrence rate of incident type 𝑗 against target 𝑘. Baseline
predictions are made using the occurrence rate of the series. For example, Malware against
Target 1 has a daily occurrence rate of 77.1%, or .77. The baseline predicts 𝑦ˆ𝑡+1 by pulling from
a Bernoulli distribution with probability equal to the series occurrence rate.
Using ARIMA to make a binary decision requires additional processing on the model predictions. Each forecast made with ARIMA is the mean of a Gaussian distribution 𝑓 (𝑥|𝜇, 𝜎 2 ) with
confidence interval (CI) based on the standard deviation. Binary decisions are made based
on the forecast value and the CI; a variety of methods are investigated here to determine the
viability of ARIMA towards binary decision making. Each method interprets the percentage of
∫𝑧
the Gaussian curve 𝑔(𝑧) = −∞ 𝑓 (𝑥|𝜇, 𝜎 2 )𝑑𝑥 under some value 𝑧. The binary prediction is made
based on the value of 𝑔(𝑧) and some threshold 𝛾 as such:

𝑦ˆ𝑡+1 =



0


𝑔(𝑧) ≥ 𝛾


1


𝑔(𝑧) < 𝛾

All methods make their binary decisions based on the ARIMA model of 𝑋 𝑗𝑘 (𝑛) or 𝑌 𝑗𝑘 (𝑛) and use
𝑧 values of 1,.5, and the historical mean 𝜇 of the time series modeled. Table 2.2 describes the
time series, 𝑧 and 𝛾 used by each method.
Table 2.2: Binary Decision Methods
M TS
𝑧 𝛾
1

count

1

.5

2

count

𝜇

.5

3

count

𝜇

.75

4

binary

.5

.5

5

binary

.5

𝜇

6

binary

𝜇

.5

Method 1 effectively pulls any forecast less than one to 0. The second and third approaches
instead use the series mean as a threshold. Method 3 differs from 2 by using a higher 𝛾, requiring
a prediction drastically lower than the series mean 𝜇 𝑥 to warrant a negative binary decision.
This attempts to overcome a weakness of ARIMA which keeps forecasts from deviating too
greatly from the series mean. The final three methods all apply ARIMA to the binary time
series 𝑌 (𝑛). As all values of 𝑌 (𝑛) are discrete, all forecasts will be between 0 and 1. Method 4
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simply rounds the ARIMA result up or down. The fifth approach uses the binary occurrence
rate as 𝛾, while method 6 uses it as its 𝑧.

2.3.5

Historic Counts as Features

Attack data can also be used as attributes for a Bayesian Network (BN) system. Bayesian
networks (BN) are probabilistic graphical models that represent the conditional dependencies
among a set of variables. Using a set of signals and a target as variables, it is possible to analyze
the probabilistic dependencies between each signal and the target and have a deeper insight
regarding the relevance of each signal. Incident intensity can be classified using historical attack
counts and occurrence patterns as signals. Using the qualitative representation of daily counts
as labels, a BN can be trained using historic attack counts over varying 𝜏 as features. Analyzing
the conditional probability table generated by the BN gives insight into how measurements for
specific features correlate to current labels.

2.3.6

𝑁-Day Ahead Predictions

While it is ideal to make predictions for a future time interval with all historical data up to
that point, it is not feasible in a real world scenario. Detecting and classifying cyber incidents
is not a trivial task, and unfortunately attacks are not always caught in real time. This can
lead to gaps in time between the end of historical data and the time interval being forecast.
ARIMA models handle this by recursively predicting one period ahead, and then retraining the
model and including the forecast value in the historical data. A 𝑁-Day ahead forecast assumes
Í 𝑁 ·Δ)
Δ = 24 hours and is 𝑦ˆ𝑡 (𝑡 − (𝑁 · Δ)) = 𝑡+(
𝑥ˆ𝑏 (𝑏 − (𝑏 · 𝜏)). 𝑁-Day ahead predictions converge to
𝑏=𝑡
the mean of the time series as eventually forecasts will be made based only on forecast values,
causing a cascading error. Aggregation forecasting configurations can be extended to include
𝑁-Day ahead forecasting as 𝐴𝐺 (𝜏, Δ, 𝑁)

2.4

Dataset Analysis and Design of Experiments

The data set used for this work contains 2599 attacks levied against 2 different targets between
January 01, 2016 and October 31, 2017. Event data for both targets was gathered by an
independent group of analysts. Each entry in the dataset has three attributes, the time 𝑡 that
the attack occurred, the type 𝑗 of malicious incident, and the target 𝑘 that suffered the attack.
Events were confirmed to have happened at the corresponding time stamp by the analysts.
The attack methods included in the dataset are: malware, malicious URL, and malicious e-
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mail. Target 1 experienced a majority of attacks over the entire period, though there are no
Malicious e-mail attacks recorded prior to October 2016. Analysts determined attacks occurred
against Target 2 over a narrower window of time, September 30, 2016 to October 31, 2017.
Target 2 also sees less average incidents per day than Target 1. Detailed information regarding
the percentage of days that see attacks and the average incident counts on days with attacks 𝑌¯
can be found in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Incident Characteristics by Method 𝑗 and Target 𝑘, til Oct. 2017
Total
% of Days
Tgt. Method Attacks With Attacks 𝑌¯
1

Malware

1334

70.2%

2.9

1

URL

138

15.0%

1.4

1

E-Mail

636

14.7%

6.5

2

Malware

169

24.7%

1.7

2

URL

127

22.0%

1.5

2

E-Mail

195

33.6%

1.5

Attack distribution and volume across targets show that each type and target configuration has
unique characteristics. The same attack type shows different occurrence rates and intensities
across targets. A majority of the incidents faced by Target 1 are Malware, while Target 2 sees
a fairly even distribution among all three methods. By having such a robust dataset centered
around single targets, a new perspective on attack patterns can be gained. Intuitively, a 𝜏 = 24
hours has been used to measure attack intensity as it provides a useful context to a target [63].
This may not maximize forecasting accuracy for all targets and methods as shown by the daily
average attacks and the daily occurrence rates. Series with a low average attacks per day
should benefit from a wider 𝜏 while those with a high average intensity may allow for a shorter
𝜏. Extreme 𝜏 values should be avoided; too small and the intensity will be predominately 0,
too large and the binary decision is nearly always true.
ˆ = 0 lim 𝑦ˆ𝑡+1 = 1, 𝑥ˆ𝑡+1 = ∞
lim 𝑦ˆ𝑡+1 = 0, 𝑥 𝑡+1
𝜏→0

2.4.1

𝜏→∞

Summary of Experiments

All ARIMA based experiments were run on count or binary time series made up of a single
attack method carried out against a specific target 𝑌𝑖, 𝑗,𝑘 . Simulation begins with the 15th
𝑡 = 15 entry of the series to allow for adequate historical data and forecasts each successive time
period with a model generated with all historic data 𝑌 [1 : (𝑡 − 1)] where 𝑡 is the current time
period. The model is updated with each forecast. A variety of model configurations were used
and are detailed in table 2.4. A naive baseline forecast was constructed using the series mean
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𝑈¯𝑡 =

1
𝑡−1

Í𝑡−1
𝑏=1

𝑦 𝑏, 𝑗,𝑘 . Models were constructed with non-random initialization; given the same

set of training data, the model would produce the same forecast. Thus only a single run of
experiments were conducted.
Table 2.4: Summary of Forecasting Configurations
Function Description
Symbol
Naive Prediction with series mean 𝑈¯𝑡
ARIMA

AA(𝜏)

Aggregation

AG(𝜏,Δ)

ARIMA Smart Regression

𝐴𝐴 𝑅 (𝜏)

Aggregation Smart Regression

𝐴𝐺 𝑅 (𝜏, Δ)

N-Day Ahead ARIMA

𝐴𝐴 𝑁 (𝜏, 𝑁)

N-Day Ahead Aggregation

𝐴𝐺 𝑁 (𝜏, Δ, 𝑁)

When constructing models with regressors occurrence pattern analysis is done only on historical
data allowing the system to capture trends and hot-spots naturally as they occur within the data.
Forward selection is done prior to each forecast made as part of the model generation. Similar
to the base ARIMA models, those with regressor components also had static initialization.
A common way of determining a forecasting model’s accuracy is to measure the mean absolute
error (MAE) of predictions. MAE is the mean of the absolute value of all prediction errors and
is defined in equation 2.3.

𝑛

𝑀 𝐴𝐸 =

1 ∑︁
|𝑥 𝑖 − 𝑥ˆ𝑖 |
𝑛 𝑖=1

(2.3)

If unable to effectively model a time series, ARIMA will use the series mean as a forecast.
To better measure ARIMA effectiveness, prediction using the series mean is conducted as a
baseline, denoted 𝑈¯𝑡 .
For experiments relating to historic counts as attributes for a Bayesian Network, past ground
truth of Target 1 and Target 2 for attacks of type Malware, URL, and Email are aggregated
over varying time granularities 𝜏 to classify future incident counts. A Machine learning model is
trained for each attack type and target pair using historic attack events of that pair. Incidents
observed in the past 4, 8, 12, 24, 72, 168, and 336 hours are used as signals. The structure of
each Bayesian model is learned using the first 70% of the data as training set and its performance
is tested against the remaining 30%. The K2 algorithm proposed by Cooper and Herskovits [10]
is used to find probable network structure during learning.
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2.5
2.5.1

Temporal Modeling Findings and Results
Volume Prediction with Varying 𝜏

Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the MAE of forecasts using the series mean and ARIMA models
for various 𝜏. Table 2.7 shows the improvement in forecast accuracy of the ARIMA models
compared to the series mean. Each column represents the percent change in the MAE compared
to the naive baseline forecasting method which predicts the series mean 𝑈¯𝑡 , for specific attack
type 𝑗 against target 𝑘. In some cases, there was not enough attack data to generate a time
series of adequate length for forecasting larger 𝜏.
Table 2.5: MAE of 𝑈¯𝑡 and
Malware URL
𝜏
𝑈¯𝑡
𝐴𝐴(𝜏)

𝐴𝐴(𝜏) by attack type for Target 1
E-mail
𝑈¯𝑡
𝐴𝐴(𝜏) 𝑈¯𝑡
𝐴𝐴(𝜏)

8

0.863

0.813

0.145

0.141

0.727

0.924

12

1.13

1.09

0.21

0.203

1.04

1.29

24

1.8

1.7

0.385

0.375

1.98

2.45

72

3.57

2.41

0.788

0.815

5.29

6.91

120

4.98

3.26

1.05

1.04

8.48

11.9

168

6.56

2.77

1.33

1.31

12.2

15.7

336

11.6

6.12

2.11

2.11

27.8

26.6

Table 2.6: MAE of 𝑈¯𝑡 and 𝐴𝐴(𝜏) by attack type for Target 2
Malware URL
E-mail
𝜏
𝑈¯𝑡
𝐴𝐴(𝜏) 𝑈¯𝑡
𝐴𝐴(𝜏) 𝑈¯𝑡
𝐴𝐴(𝜏)
8

0.278

0.258

0.217

0.199

0.295

0.292

12

0.388

0.361

0.308

0.271

0.404

0.399

24

0.661

0.616

0.545

0.467

0.661

0.662

72

1.35

2.32

1.17

1.17

1.12

0.752

120

1.89

3.29

1.81

1.81

1.56

0.913

168

2.16

3.37

2.35

2.35

1.87

0.55

336

3.58

-

3.67

-

2.81

0.388

ARIMA proves very effective with all 𝜏 values for malware against Target 1 hinting at strong
micro and macro temporal correlation between incidents. Using a weekly aggregation time
𝜏 = 168 hours provides the best results improving prediction accuracy by nearly 60 percent.
Interestingly, this same correlation is not found in malware against Target 2 evidencing the
theory that temporal relationships can differ across targets. Using 𝜏 < 24 improved ARIMA
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Table 2.7: MAE Percent Improvement of 𝐴𝐴(𝜏) over 𝑈¯𝑡 by Target and Attack Type
Target 1
Target 2
𝜏

Malware

URL

E-mail

Malware

URL

E-mail

8

05.88%

02.98%

-27.1%

07.30%

08.25%

00.86%

12

04.21%

03.29%

-23.6%

06.81%

11.82%

01.15%

24

05.12%

02.58%

-23.4%

06.74%

14.26%

-0.21%

72

32.6%

-3.4%

-30.6%

-72.17%

.27%

32.9%

120

34.5%

.7%

-39.8%

-74.0%

0%

41.5%

168

57.7%

1.6%

-28.8%

-55.8%

0%

70.6%

336

47.2%

.17%

4.3%

-

-

86.2%

forecasts as expected from table 2.1. URL attacks against Target 2 see higher performance for
𝜏 = 24, though this is consistent with the significant lags found in PACF analysis.
E-mail attacks levied at Target 2 highlight the importance of choosing 𝜏 in relation to the
time series under analysis. Using at least a 3 day measurement period allows ARIMA to greatly
outperform the baseline approach, reaching a 86.2% improvement with a 𝜏 = 336 hours. Without
analyzing attack count series with varying 𝜏 values temporal relationships within the data may
remain undetected, leading to poor forecasting. Although it cannot always accurately predict
a specific day’s intensity, ARIMA provides a more accurate representation of future trends in
incident volume over a future period of time. In a real world scenario, it is unlikely that a
target could update their internal attack dataset to keep up with smaller 𝜏 values as attack
classification is not effectively automated [4]. Having the ability to accurately predict incoming
intensity for a larger period of time could prove useful in general awareness but does not provide
active insights into current behavior to an analyst.
The results for E-mail against target 1 highlight the weakness of ARIMA when dealing with
time series that have ”extreme” values [71]. Only one third of the measurements are non-zero,
however the average value of non-zero entries is 9.1. It would seem that it is the disparity in the
count values rather than the general sparsity of the series as URL attacks against both Targets 1
and 2 are better predicted with ARIMA for most 𝜏 values. ARIMA forecasts by design will not
reach to the edges of a dataset’s range. ARIMA is still able to discover and model trends and
correlations within the data, however high variance datasets negatively impact model accuracy.
With 𝜏 = 336 hours the effect of days without incident within the set is diminished, and ARIMA
is able to accurately forecast intensity, implying that temporal correlations still exist for the
attack type.
ARIMA models do not provide any real benefit for E-mail attacks against Target 2. The very
low change in error suggests that the time series does not contain strong enough correlations
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to significantly move forecasts away from the series mean. Due to these results, TS based on
E-mail counts are not modeled for aggregation forecasting or with regressors.
While the ARIMA models do capture overall trends in attack intensity, the individual forecasts
do not provide significant insights to an analyst. Especially for 𝜏 <= 24 ARIMA’s error is very
close to the baseline’s. While weekly, and bi-weekly time series modeled by ARIMA can give
significantly more accurate forecasts, an analyst will struggle to use that information effectively
in real time. In a live environment, an analyst will be most interested in what they can expect
over the course of the day.

2.5.2

Volume Prediction Aggregation

Aggregation prediction aims to capture a day’s expected attack count using multiple intra-day
forecasts. Results of aggregation prediction for various configurations is shown in table 2.8.
Aggregation of forecasts using smaller 𝜏 more accurately determined volume for a future day
Δ = 24 than using ARIMA models over daily attack counts. All attack types and targets
experienced better daily intensity forecasts using aggregation of 8 or 12 hour predictions. This
is an interesting result as the 𝐴𝐴(𝜏) forecasts did not show such significant improvement over
𝜏 = 24, illustrating ARIMA’s strength at mapping trends within the data while not necessarily
being able to accurately forecast specific values within a series.
Table 2.8: MAE and % Improvement for 𝐴𝐺 (𝜏, 24) Over 𝐴𝐴(24)
Target Method
𝐴𝐺 (8, 24)
𝐴𝐺 (12, 24)
MAE

%

MAE

%

1

Malware

1.61

09.2%

1.75

01.2%

1

URL

0.33

11.2%

0.349

07.0%

2

Malware

0.564

08.5%

0.580

05.9%

2

URL

0.462

01.1%

0.432

07.6%

All aggregation configurations produce positive results compared to daily ARIMA forecasts.
Constructing a daily prediction from multiple predictions made at smaller 𝜏 improves forecast
accuracy by up to 11.2% over ARIMA models based on TS with 𝜏 = 24 hours.
In all cases, aggregated forecasts saw improvement when using the recommended 𝜏 derived from
the ACF functions of the TS and shown in table 2.1. Aggregation prediction results show that
there are distinct trends and patterns that emerge over the course of a day. Using a daily
measurement period 𝜏 = 24 overlooks these daily trends, and leads to lower performance.
Aggregation results highlight the power of ARIMA when modeling temporal trends as they
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emerge in a dataset. While it may not be realistic to have intra-day updates to the attack
dataset, the idea of aggregation prediction can be expanded to larger Δ windows that better
allow for updated count measurements.

2.5.3

Attack Occurrence Prediction

Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show the performance of daily binary predictions made by different interpretations of the ARIMA output and confidence interval for both targets. Baseline results were
collected using an educated random guess based on the distribution of occurrence rates for the
series as a whole. All predictions were made with 𝜏 = 24 hours.
Nearly all proposed methods provide better binary decision making compared to the baseline for
all metrics. Method 1 performs quite well for Target 1 considering it contains higher counts on
average than the other targets. This goes against intuition as the model was able to accurately
pull its prediction down below 1 consistently. The weakest methods are 2 and 3, which both
base their decisions off the proximity of the forecast to 𝜇. This method of interpretation may be
accurate in terms of the trend of future intensity, it does not prove useful in the explicit binary
decision. Interestingly method 6 uses the mean of the discrete time series 𝑌 (𝑛) to great success,
seeing the most consistent results for all attack types and targets. A method’s performance
seems to be dependent more on the 𝑧 value selected than the threshold 𝛾. This can be seen
in the similar results of methods 2 and 3, as well as 4 and 5. In some cases, increasing 𝛾 even
leads to poorer performance.
Table 2.11 shows the AUC values and the significantly correlated signals when the occurrence of
attacks is predicted against Target 1 and Target 2. For the Malware and Email attacks against
Target 1, signals based on all 𝜏 values except 4 and 8 have found to be influential attributes.
For the URL attack type, aggregating signals over the last 336 hours seems to be effective.
The 𝐹−Measure of the models have found to be 0.83 and 0.57 for the Malware and Email
attack types, whereas it is undefined for the URL attacks as the model is predicting zero all
the time. Similarly, 72 and 168 hours have found to be significant aggregation periods for the
Email attacks against Target 2 and the 𝐹−Measure value has found to be 0.35. For the Malware
and URL attacks against Target 2, the BN approach did not have a predictive power and an
𝐹−Measure could not be calculated as the model predicted zero all the time. These results
support the results obtained with ARIMA where ARIMA performs better for the Malware and
Email attacks against Target 1 and the Email attacks against Target 2.
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Table 2.9: Daily Binary Decision Results for Target 1
MALWARE
Method

AUC

Precision

Recall

Acc

FMeas.

Baseline

.51

.77

.79

.66

.78

M1

.53

.81

.95

.78

.87

M2

.60

.07

.08

.20

.076

M3

.52

.12

.68

.14

.21

M4

.52

.779

.96

.75

.85

M5

.50

.76

.998

.76

.86

M6

.63

.87

.51

.57

.64

Method

AUC

Precision

Recall

Acc

FMeas.

Baseline

.48

.18

.2

.65

.19

M1

.5

-

0

.79

-

M2

.53

.13

.37

.49

.17

M3

.5

.12

1

.12

.21

M4

.5

-

0

.80

-

M5

.5

-

0

.80

-

M6

.56

.25

.5

.60

.33

Method

AUC

Precision

Recall

Acc

FMeas.

Baseline

.50

.36

.37

.54

.36

M1

.57

.39

.93

.46

.55

M2

.5

.15

.18

.54

.17

M3

.5

.14

1

.14

.25

M4

.63

.56

.45

.68

.50

M5

.57

.60

.22

.67

.32

M6

.66

.50

.69

.65

.58

URL

E-mail

2.5.4

Categorical Representation of Intensity Predictions

To better classify intensity predictions and overcome the smoothing of values by the ARIMA
model, a qualitative interpretation of predictions was explored. This experiment was only
conducted for target 1 as it consistently experiences a wide range of attacks per day. Target 2
sees lower average counts, as such the categorization for forecasts would be similar to the binary
predictions made with ARIMA. Four categories were used for classification, zero, low, average,
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Table 2.10: Daily Binary Decision Results for Target 2
MALWARE
Method

AUC

Precision

Recall

Acc

FMeas.

Baseline

.50

.33

.33

.55

.33

M1

.48

.33

.02

.71

.05

M2

.51

.23

.69

.34

.34

M3

.50

.23

1.0

.23

.37

M4

.54

.43

.25

.64

.32

M5

.49

0.0

0.0

.66

-

M6

.46

.31

.67

.39

.42

Method

AUC

Precision

Recall

Acc

FMeas.

Baseline

.55

.09

.20

.87

.12

M1

.50

-

0.0

.94

-

M2

.37

0.0

0.0

.71

-

M3

.50

.05

1.0

.05

.09

M4

.50

-

0.0

.95

-

M5

.50

-

0.0

.95

-

M6

.64

.09

.60

.69

.15

Method

AUC

Precision

Recall

Acc

FMeas.

Baseline

.42

.29

.28

.45

.28

M1

.50

-

0.0

.93

-

M2

.86

.26

.88

.79

.40

M3

.87

.26

.96

.77

.40

M4

.51

.13

.06

.86

.09

M5

.50

-

0.0

.89

-

M6

.87

.36

.94

.82

.52

URL

E-mail

Table 2.11: The AUC and significant signals for binary prediction against Target 1 and Target
2.
Target 1

Target 2

AUC

Signals

AUC

Signals

Malware

0.60

12, 24, 72, 120, 136, 338

0.50

NA

URL

0.54

336

0.50

NA

Email

0.58

12, 24, 72, 120, 136, 338

0.77

72, 168

and high intensity. For all attack types, an ARIMA prediction less than 1 was categorized
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as zero activity. The other three ranges were based on the distribution of attack counts with
aggregation period 𝜏 = 24 hours. Classification performance was determined using the Multiclass Area Under the Curve (M-AUC). For each attack category: zero(0), low(1), average(2),
and high(3), F-Measure (FM) was calculated when possible based on true positive and true
negative rates of classification. Classification results can be seen in Table 2.12.
Table 2.12: Results of Categorical Representation of ARIMA Forecasts
Attack Type Predictor AUC FM(0) FM(1) FM(2) FM(3)
Malware

URL

E-mail

Naive

.50

-*

-

.62

-

ARIMA

.56

.17

-

.60

.21

BN

.61

.17

-

.60

.21

Naive

.50

.88

-

-

-

ARIMA

.50

.88

-

-

-

BN

.50

.17

-

.60

.21

Naive

.53

.39

-

.26

-

ARIMA

.60

.36

-

.25

.26

BN

.63

.17

-

.60

.21

The models used by ARIMA see improved M-AUC compared to prediction using the mean for
malware and e-mail attacks. Naively using the mean sees a significant bias towards one specific
classification for each attack type as the mean does not fluctuate drastically over time in a
series.
Table 2.13: The AUC and significant signals in category prediction
AUC Signals
Malware

0.61

24, 72, 120, 136, 338

URL

0.50

NA

Email

0.63

12, 24, 72, 120, 136, 338

To predict the attack categories zero (0), low (1), average (2), and high (3) intensity, a Bayesian
model is trained for each attack type against Target 1 using category as a class attribute this
time. The AUC values in Table 2.13 show that models for the Malware and Email attack types
are better predictors when compared to the model for the URL attack type. Furthermore,
signals created by aggregating attacks over the past 24, 72, 120, 136, 338 hours seem to be
indicative for both the Malware and Email attack categories. For the Malware attack type, the
𝐹−Measure values of 0 and 2 categories are found to be 0.5 and 0.64 respectively. Moreover, for
the Email attack type, the 𝐹−Measure values of 0, 2 and 3 categories are found to be 0.74, 0.19,
and 0.26 respectively. The 𝐹−Measure values of other categories for the Malware and Email
attack types were not available as they had no true and false positives which led to an undefined
precision score. On the other hand, although the 𝐹−Measure value of category 0 was observed
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Table 2.14: MAE for 𝐴𝐺 𝑅 (𝜏, 24) and % improvement over 𝑈¯𝑡 and 𝐴𝐺 (𝜏, 24)
Target Method Config.
MAE Over 𝑈¯𝑡 Over 𝐴𝐺 (𝜏, 24)
1

Malware

𝐴𝐺 𝑅 (8, 24)

1.44

18.2%

06.8 %

1

URL

𝐴𝐺 𝑅 (8, 24)

0.34

10.9%

-03.0 %

2

Malware

𝐴𝐺 𝑅 (8, 24)

0.50

24.9 %

11.8 %

2

URL

𝐴𝐺 𝑅 (12, 24)

0.43

20.6%

-0.3 %

to be 0.91, the Bayesian model learned for the URL attack type had no predictive power in
terms of AUC, as the model was not able to learn from relatively fewer positive instances
and was predicting the zero category all the time. When compared to the ARIMA categorical
classification results, BN approach provides comparable results and can more accurately predict
certain categories for all attack types.

2.5.5

ARIMA with Intensity-based Regressors

For each target and method combination, the best performing aggregation configuration was
modeled with a set of regressors determined with forward selection. Regression vectors were
selected from the group corresponding to each measurement period occurring in a week. The
forward selection process determines the time periods that significantly correlate to incident
counts, and incorporates a linear regression component into the ARIMA model, reducing some
of the inherent lag in forecasting. Table 2.14 shows the improvement regressors had on prediction
using the best performing aggregation configuration for each attack type and target.
Including regressor vectors in the ARIMA model further increase forecast accuracy for malware
attacks by up to 11.8% over 𝐴𝐺 (𝜏, 24) with no regressors. Such positive results show that attack
behavior is regular over the course of many weeks and can be modeled and anticipated. These
periods are indicative toward attack intensity and can be used as regressors in an ARIMA model
to improve forecasts.
The same cannot be said for URL attacks, where forecasts suffered reduced accuracy compared
to ARIMA with no regressors. While time of the week may not correlate to URL attack patterns
there may be other measurable signals [37] that can be explored for use as regressors to improve
model accuracy.
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Table 2.15: MAE for 𝐴𝐺 𝑁 (𝜏, 24, 1) and % Improvement Over 𝑈¯𝑡 for 𝑁-Day Ahead Forecasts
Tgt Method MAE Over 𝑈¯𝑡 Over 𝐴𝐴(24)
1

Malware

1.67

07.2%

01.8%

1

URL

.371

03.6%

02.6%

2

Malware

.616

06.8%

00.5%

2

URL

.460

15.6%

02.1%

Table 2.16: MAE for 𝐴𝐺 𝑁 (𝜏, 24, 7) and % Improvement Over 𝑈¯𝑡 for 𝑁-Day Ahead Forecasts
Tgt Method MAE Over 𝑈¯𝑡 Over 𝐴𝐴(24)

2.5.6

1

Malware

1.68

06.7%

01.2%

1

URL

.380

01.3%

00.0%

2

Malware

.630

04.7%

-2.3%

2

URL

.474

13.0%

-0.9%

𝑁-Day Ahead Prediction

Using 𝑁-Day ahead predictions better follow a real world scenario as having intra-day updates
of incident counts is unreasonable. Tables 2.15 and 2.16 show prediction error for 1 and 7Day ahead forecasting for each Target and method, as well as improvement over the baseline
and daily ARIMA forecasts. Both 1 and 7-Day ahead models showed very promising results,
outperforming the baseline by over 15% when predicting a future day’s intensity. Aggregated
daily forecasts 𝐴𝐺 (𝜏, 24, 1) were also slightly more accurate than using a daily measurement
period 𝐴𝐴(24) to forecast intensity. Malware against Target 1 also shows strong performance
at 𝑁 = 7 days ahead with over 7% improvement over prediction with the mean. As expected,
there is an increase in forecasting error when predicting more than one time period 𝜏 ahead,
however configurations still see equivalent or slightly better performance for 𝑁 = 1 compared to
standard ARIMA 𝐴𝐴(24) daily predictions.
Intuitively, forecasts would see a decrease in performance with increasing 𝑁 as 𝑁-Day ahead
predictions are based on previous forecasts rather than ground truth. Interestingly, the error
does not significantly increase over time but stays fairly flat at higher 𝑁. The results presented
are the average error over a large number of forecasts; investigating the results at a finer grain
reveals fluctuations in forecast accuracy, with the model predicting the series mean for some
periods of time. This effect is a likely cause of the similar error between 1 and 7-Day ahead
forecasts, and further evidences the hypothesis that attack patterns and occurrence rates change
over time. Further work is needed in analyzing the dataset to better determine the relevant
historical periods for model generation.
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2.5.7

Intensity Classification with BN

For each day 𝑑, the total number of incidents in the last 4, 8, 12, 24, 72, 168, and 336 hours
are used as signals and the total number of events within day 𝑑 is used as class attribute to
train and test a Bayesian model for each attack type and target pair. The first two weeks (336
hours) are used to aggregate signals, therefore the training sets start from day 15. For each
Bayesian network learned, signals that are connected with the class attribute are marked as
significant. The AUC values in Table 2.18 show that using the aggregation of attacks during
the last 168, 336 hours has a predictive power for Malware attacks against Target 1. Similarly,
the dependencies in the Bayesian network in Figure 2.3 show that using the the number of
attacks in the last 24, 72, 120, 168, 336 hours helps to predict Email attacks against Target
2. The conditional probability table obtained from the Bayesian network learned for Malware
attacks against Target 1 is shown in Table 2.17. When the total number of attacks during the
last 168 hours are larger than 15, the probability of having more attacks (larger GT) is higher.
For example, for the GT values higher than 2, the probability of having more than 15 attacks
during the last 168 hours is consistently higher.

Figure 2.3: An example BN learned for the Email attacks against Target 2.

Table 2.17: Conditional probability table for signal 168h obtained from the BN learned for the
Malware attacks against Target 1.
GT

<15

>15

GT

<15

>15

GT

<15

>15

0

0.54

0.46

8

0.06

0.94

16

0.13

0.88

1

0.56

0.44

9

0.12

0.88

17

0.17

0.83

2

0.29

0.71

10

0.07

0.93

19

0.17

0.83

3

0.22

0.78

11

0.06

0.94

20

0.17

0.83

4

0.14

0.86

12

0.13

0.88

26

0.25

0.75

5

0.13

0.87

13

0.07

0.93

33

0.25

0.75

6

0.09

0.91

14

0.13

0.88

35

0.25

0.75

7

0.02

0.98

15

0.25

0.75

37

0.25

0.75
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Most of these results support the findings in Table 2.7 where a higher MSE improvement was
observed with ARIMA for Malware against Target 1 and Email against Target 2 for quite
similar 𝜏 values. However, although ARIMA finds a MSE improvement over the series mean
while predicting URL attacks against Target 2 with smaller 𝜏 values (like 4, 8, and 12), signals
aggregated over these 𝜏 values do not seem to be useful in the corresponding Bayesian model.
Table 2.3 shows that the total number of cyber incidents of type URL against Target 2 is 126
and in only 2.7% of the days a cyber incident was observed. Because 70% of the data set is used
for training, even fewer instances with a cyber incident are included in the training set and the
Bayesian model was not able to learn from the highly skewed data.
Table 2.18: The Area Under ROC Curve (AUC) and significant signals during count prediction
with BN.
AUC

Signals

Target 1 / Malware

0.62

168, 336

Target 2 / Email

0.67

24, 72, 120, 168, 336

The Bayesian Network findings show that non-standard aggregation periods 𝜏 ≠ 24 can provide
insight into daily attack forecasting. ARIMA models can be built over a smaller subset of
the data when compared to BN, allowing for more accurate predictions in the case of skewed
sets such as URL against Target 2. Varying 𝜏 can allow for previously unseen correlations to
emerge and allow for more accurate intensity forecasts. This is a unique application of temporal
characteristics to a classification problem. Unless built into the attributes classification methods
do not normally consider temporal relationships or trends across successive labels. These results
highlight the temporal relationships between attack events and advocate for their use as features
in a relevant classification problem.

2.6

Conclusions, Limitations and Lessons Learned

This work explored the temporal characteristics of cyber events and found strong correlations
between historical and future occurrence intensity. ARIMA forecasting models could improve
forecasting over the baseline for most attack types against both targets in the dataset. Varying
the time series aggregation period showed that there can be both long term and intra-day
temporal correlations present not evident with a 𝜏 = 24 hours. Results varied by target and
attack method, URL attacks against Target 2 saw up to 30% improvement for 𝜏 <= 12 hours
while E-mail attacks only saw positive improvement, up to 86%, for 𝜏 >= 72. ARIMA models
of the discrete time series 𝑌 (𝑛) varied similarly depending on the characteristics of the dataset.
Intra-day patterns can be leveraged through aggregation forecasts to predict a day’s attack in-
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tensity using multiple intra-day predictions. Time based regressors enhance ARIMA models for
malware attacks. Further investigation into regressor vectors should be done to find explanatory
signals for all attack types. Regressor vectors can include external non-standard signals such as
twitter mentions of a Target. The use of such signals with ARIMA could yield further insight
as they have been shown effective as attributes in a Bayesian classification scheme [37].
When predicting multiple days in the future, ARIMA models were able to perform well in
comparison to the baseline of prediction using the series mean, generating 15% increases in
accuracy. Aggregated ARIMA proved capable of accurately predicting attack counts up to a
week in advance while also being just as, if not more accurate than, standard daily forecasting.
A Bayesian network (BN) trained using such aggregations provides evidence that supports the
findings obtained with ARIMA; in most cases, the 𝜏 that saw improved ARIMA forecasting
also was a relevant signal in BN classification. Expanding the context to include external
unconventional signals as attributes to a BN or as regressors to ARIMA could yield further
insight into the characteristics of cyber incidents. Such signals have shown to be effective in
Bayesian classification schemes [37].
While these modeling techniques can leverage temporal relationships, it is difficult for them to
provide an analyst insight into current activity occurring within their network. While accurate
intensity forecasting can help an analyst prepare for a day’s attacks, it does not give any insights
into how the malicious entities are attacking a network. Further, ARIMA forecast accuracy is
not significantly higher compared to the historic average. In all intra-day cases average error of
ARIMA models were the same as the baseline if rounded to the nearest whole number. This is
further compounded when one considers the dataset itself. Cyber analysts manually assessed
historic activity within their network to manually determine attack event occurrences. It is
unreasonable to expect up to date counts as they will likely lag by days, if not weeks. While
attack count forecasts can give a hint towards the type of attacks that are more likely for a
given day, analysts will still actively monitor for all types of attacks. Post processing of network
activity can produce the attack events used in experiments, but these are made up of many
individual IDS alerts. Live monitoring and detection of specific signature patterns would be
more beneficial to an analyst compared to high level “attack” events.
With these limitations in mind, this work shifts focus to data which is easily accessible without
analyst processing and indicative toward current attacker actions and activity. Cyber events
are determined based on IDS alerts and other internal analytics. It follows then that temporal
relationships should exist among the IDS alerts generated by a defense system. If these alerts
could be processed quickly, in a way that extracts information pertinent to an analyst it could
provide another line of defense against attacks.
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Potential future work in the field of forecasting applied to cyber events should focus on model
robustness. The exploratory nature of this work lead to the use of standard and relatively simple
modeling approaches. The datasets used in this work had a limited number of potential features
to be modeled, leading to the use of ARIMA and time series modeling. While these were effective
at discovering temporal relationships and trends within cyber attack counts, more advanced
modeling approaches could further improve forecast accuracy. N-th order auto-regressive models
have recently been applied to DDOS detection [50]. T Recurrent and Convolutional Neural Nets
have been applied to time series of IDS alerts for anomaly detection [61] and would likely prove
effective when applied to cyber attack counts.

Chapter 3

CLEAR
3.1

Introduction

Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are commonly used within networks to monitor traffic and
detect potentially anomalous or malicious behavior [28]. While these systems are necessary for
maintaining security, they can quickly generate an overwhelming number of alerts making it
difficult or even impossible for an analyst to deduce insights in a reasonable amount of time [15].
Building upon the insights gained from the previous chapter, can the temporal relationships
between cyber alerts be captured to assist analysts? Alert aggregation [25] is an emerging
field of research that aims to reduce the overall number of alerts by removing redundant ones,
but provides no further insight into the alerts themselves. IDS alert processing systems, such
as attack graphs, attempt to correlate alerts to provide a deeper understanding of the threats
facing a network [23]; however, these usually depend on expert knowledge and network scanning.
Finding intrusion alerts that are related or correlated is a difficult task as there is no direct
labeling of alerts to attacker actions. Mappings such as MITRE ATT&CK [33] are based on
expert knowledge and are not always applicable given how attacker tactics change over time [54].
There is a need for fast, automated processing that gives analysts a deeper understanding of
related alerts and their characteristics. Given the temporal correlations found between intra-day
cyber event counts, it is reasonable to assume that similar relationships will be present among
IDS alerts. A cyber attack event is representative of many IDS alerts, as most attacks require
multiple attacker actions. Is there a way to detect these temporally related alerts?
In an attempt to meet this need, research has attempted to automatically summarize alerts as
attack models, e.g., [36]. Note that network traffic and cyber alert arrivals are non-stationary
processes [57]; alert arrival behavior changes over time, sometimes drastically. Figure 3.1 illustrates cyber alerts generated over time within a network. This toy example shows that the
34
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arrival patterns are changing and potentially repeating over time. It would be difficult for an
analyst to detect and track such changes, but an automated system could potentially process
and group alerts in near real-time without contextual knowledge. By learning and tracking
these invariant and unique temporal arrival patterns, ‘concepts’ could be learned to aggregate
correlated but not necessarily identical alerts. Furthermore, it will be of great value if specific
alerts, reflecting specific attack actions, exhibit consistent temporal characteristics. Such information on the arrival timing of critical alerts can potentially enable proactive decision making
for cyber defense.

Figure 3.1: An example of intrusion alerts arriving over time
This work introduces the Concept Learning for Intrusion Event Aggregation in Realtime (CLEAR)
system, which is driven by the intuition that alerts exhibiting similar temporal characteristics
are most likely related to one another in some way. The system consumes alerts as they are
produced by IDS. CLEAR adds a dimension to alert aggregation by grouping alerts based on
the stationarity of their inter arrival times (IATs). Rather than simply reducing ‘redundant’
alerts, aggregates now represent a consistent and continual arrival behavior captured in near
real-time.
Aggregates with statistically similar distributions are collected into ‘concepts’ by the system
in an unsupervised manner with no training. This novel system learns, maintains and updates
historic concepts as new alerts arrive. Tracked concept’s statistics are applied to incoming alerts
to provide faster and more confident aggregation. CLEAR’s learning was designed to generate
‘tight,’ invariant concepts reflecting specific and unique temporal behaviors. CLEAR’s continual
aggregation and concept learning set it apart from similar drift detection methods such as the
Two stage shift detection based on EWMA (TSSD-EWMA) [43].
The main contributions of this work are:
• Develop a novel CLEAR system that continually learns to aggregate alerts in near realtime by statistically matching the distribution of arrival times to a learned ‘concept.’
• Demonstrate the performance improvements of CLEAR over the baseline approach, TSSDEWMA, in terms of concept uniqueness and tightness, using a real-world cyber intrusion
alert dataset.
• Derive insights of intrusion activities using CLEAR to discover alerts that exhibit consis-
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tent temporal behaviors and co-occurrence in a real-world penetration testing setting.

3.2

Related Work

3.2.1

Alert Aggregation

IDS systems work to detect anomalous or malicious network activity and raise alerts to network
administrators to allow them to combat threats to a network [28]. Given the prevalence, size
and complexity of modern networks most IDS systems produce an extremely large number
of alerts [15]. One of the greatest challenges facing the security field is processing these alerts
effectively in order to construct a clear and unified knowledge of a network’s security status [29].
Aggregating IDS alert data is an emerging field of study that aims to reduce the overall number
of alerts with minimal information loss [25]. Alert reduction is accomplished by removing
successive alerts of the same type caused by ongoing activity, e.g, scanning, or alerts that are
generated from the same activity by multiple scanners [24]. Traditional aggregation aims to
remove ‘redundant’ alerts [52] but provides no deeper insight into the alerts presented to an
analyst.
Researchers in [36] aggregated alerts to train Bayesian models around individual attributes in an
attempt to learn attack behaviors. A naive timing threshold was used that ended an aggregate
after a sufficiently long time with no new arrivals. This approach is not ideal as it is unclear
what a “good” threshold is, or how it should change depending on overall network patterns.
CLEAR’s statistics driven approach to aggregation based on the stationarity of alert arrival
statistics improves the value of aggregates by ensuring they represent unique and invariant
temporal behaviors.

3.2.2

Temporal Correlation of Cyber Events

The idea that alerts can be related to temporally near ones is not an inherently novel idea. Time
series modeling has been applied to network traffic, alert counts and cyber intrusion events to
model temporal relationships in the data. ARIMA models effectively forecasting cyber event
counts in [63] suggest that cyber event occurrences are temporally correlated. Further work
found that malicious activity levels can change and repeat over time [64]. Time series modeling of hourly counts of individual signatures was conducted in [58] to detect abnormalities in
occurrence. The findings of these related works indicate it is worthwhile to consider temporal
relationships across alerts. This helped inform the intuition that alerts exhibiting similar temporal characteristics are related. To our knowledge, this is the first work to process cyber alert
inter arrival times to determine such relationships.
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Concept Drift Detection with EWMA

It is reasonable to assume that the distributions of and relationships between features and
labels will change over time [43]. These changes are commonly referred to as concept drift [34].
Concept drift is very common in network and human generated traffic online [57]. Drift can
happen abruptly or gradually depending on the data and its context [16]. If unaccounted for,
drift will cause a degradation in model accuracy [5].
Concept drift adaptation is an emerging field of study that has been explored under various
names in research [34]. Handling concept drift is a necessary component for processing cyber
alerts as the relevance of features can change over time [38]. Most applications of drift detection
schemes are to classification problems [16], and it is common to use classifier error for drift
detection [3]. Feature or covariate drift measures change in the distributions of only the input
features of the system [34].
Data streams are increasingly common and are often non-stationarity [60]. While many are
multi-variate, univariate streams exist and can also exhibit drift [9]. A univariate model uses
a single feature to make its predictions. This work considers the univariate model feature
to be historic measurements of the series being modeled. Should the relationship between
historic and future measurements change, a feature drift has occurred in the system [9]. Some
drift detection tests, such as change detection mechanisms, process the statistics of individual
features to determine if a drift has occurred [7].
Raza et. al proposed a two stage feature drift detection system for univariate and multivariate
series built around the exponentially weighted moving average based control chart [43]. A control
chart is a graphical representation of a series used in statistical process control theory [45].
EWMA Charts measure the exponentially weighted moving average of a series and construct a
control limit (CL) based on the standard deviation of the one step ahead prediction error. It is
a two stage system; in stage one the control chart raises a warning when a measurement falls
outside the CL. In stage two more measurements are collected and the two-sample Kolmogorov
Smirnov test (KS-Test) [31] is used to determine if drift has occurred.
Recently, research in the area has expanded to address the potential for historic concepts to
re-appear. In such a scenario, a system that leverages historic concepts can reduce the impact
of a drift by more quickly detecting and adapting to drift [6]. As with standard drift detection
most methods focus on classification problems. Solutions maintain multiple models and make
a classification with an ensemble approach [35]. Little focus has been made towards learning
the statistics of the various concepts exhibited within a system.
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CLEAR: Design Methodology
Definition: Concepts and Aggregates

CLEAR processes a series of cyber alert event arrivals 𝑋, with timestamps 𝑇 = {𝑡0 , 𝑡1 , ...𝑡 𝑛 } and
interarrival times (IATs) Δ𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 − 𝑡𝑖−1 . As new alerts arrive their IAT statistics are processed
to group them based on arrival characteristics in an attempt to capture an attacker action. An
aggregate is defined as a consecutive set of alerts 𝐴 𝑗 = {𝑥 𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖+1 , ..., 𝑥 𝑖+𝑛 } that exhibit similar
inter-arrival times. A concept 𝐶 𝑘 is a collection of aggregates whose IAT distributions are
statistically similar to one another.
There are two main components within CLEAR. The first conducts aggregation in near real-time
using EWMA control charts in terms of alert IATs. The second continually learns and maintains
concepts from aggregates and uses the two-sample KS-Test to optimally match the current
aggregate 𝐴𝑐𝑢𝑟 to a known concept 𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 . Completed aggregates are used to update existing
concept statistics while tracked concepts are used to assist in ongoing real-time aggregation. The
current aggregate remains open so long as the distribution of the alert IATs remains stationary.
When a change in stationarity is detected, the current aggregate is ended and passed to the
concept learning engine to find and update the concept that best reflects its temporal patterns
𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 .

3.3.2

Control Charts

CLEAR captures aggregates using an EWMA control chart constructed around alert IATs.
Control charts are designed to measure the stationarity of a system [45], and have been applied
to general concept drift detection in the past [43]. Control charts are an ideal candidate for alert
processing as they update with each new arrival and can detect potential changes in stationarity
in at most one additional arrival from the change point.
The control chart maintains a moving average of incoming alert IATs as shown in (3.1). The
moving average is used as a one step ahead forecast for the next IAT measurement Δ̂𝑖+1 = 𝑧 𝑖 . The
variance of this prediction error (3.2) is incorporated into a second moving average (3.3) used
to construct control limits for the chart (3.4). The Control Limit can be widened or narrowed
by changing the parameter 𝐿; it is normally 1.96 [45]. A measurement that falls outside of the
chart’s CL is refereed to as a point of drift [43].
𝑧 𝑖 = 𝛼Δ𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑧 𝑖−1

(3.1)

𝜖 = 𝑥 𝑖 − 𝑧 𝑖−1

(3.2)

𝜎𝜖2𝑖 = 𝛼 𝜖 𝜖 𝑖2 + (1 − 𝛼 𝜖 )𝜎𝜖2𝑖−1

(3.3)
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𝐶 𝐿 𝑖+1 = 𝑧 𝑖 ± 𝐿𝜎𝜖𝑖

3.3.3

(3.4)

Two-Sample KS-Test

The two-sample KS-Test measures the distance between the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of two sample distributions and is described in (3.5) where 𝑠𝑢 𝑝 𝑥 is the supremum, and 𝑛𝑖
is the number of measurements in a sample. Given two sorted samples, the two-sample KS-Test
compares the first entry in both. The sample with the lesser value is iterated over until a new
measurement is found. With each step the integral distance is incremented by the size of the
other sample. This process is repeated until all measurements from both samples have been
processed. The largest value found during this process is then divided by the product of the
two sample sizes to produce the KS-Distance.

𝐷 𝐾 𝑆 = 𝑠𝑢 𝑝 𝑥 |𝐶𝐷𝐹1,𝑛1 (𝑥) − 𝐶𝐷𝐹2,𝑛2 (𝑥)|

(3.5)

The test operates under the null hypothesis that both samples are from the same distribution.
To test this hypothesis, a critical distance can be estimated based on the sizes of the samples
and the level of confidence required. This approximation can be found in (3.6), with the note
that a 95% confidence was used to determine the scaling coefficient applied to the function [21].
Should the measured distance of the KS-Test exceed the critical value, the null hypothesis must
be rejected; the two samples must be from unique distributions.
√︂
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝐷 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 1.36
𝑛1 𝑛2

3.3.4

(3.6)

CLEAR’s Approach to Aggregation

A flowchart detailing how CLEAR processes a new alert arrival is described in Figure 3.2. A
current aggregate 𝐴𝑐𝑢𝑟 is maintained that intakes new alert arrivals in near real-time. When
a new alert arrives it is added to the current aggregate and the most recent IAT is computed.
The IAT is compared with the control limits of the aggregate’s EWMA chart. If it falls within
the chart’s control limit the KS-Test is used to find the concept 𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 whose IAT distribution is
most statistically similar to the current aggregate’s. If 𝐶𝑏𝑒𝑠𝑡 has not changed since the last alert
the current aggregate’s EWMA is updated with the most recent IAT. Should a new concept be
determined to be the best match the current aggregate copies that concept’s EWMA statistics
over its own and updates them with all IATs in the current aggregate. By leveraging the
two-sample KS-Test and historic concept control charts in such a way CLEAR provides near
immediate insight into the expected characteristics of the current aggregate. Additionally, the
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confidence in the aggregate’s control chart is increased as it is built on a larger pool of historic
measurements and not just the limited ones contained in 𝐴𝑐𝑢𝑟 .

Figure 3.2: Flowchart of CLEAR alert processing
Under the TSSD-EWMA system, when a new measurement falls outside of the CL a warning is
raised and the system stops processing until a predefined number of new measurements arrive.
These new measurements are then compared with the measurements made prior to the warning
using the two-sample KS-Test. If the distance is above the critical value, the measurements
made since the warning are considered a new concept. A new control chart is generated using
these measurements and processing continues with the prior concept being forgotten.
In CLEAR, a new IAT that falls outside of the CL immediately ends the current aggregate.
Should the concept remain the same after the drift point the new aggregate will be matched
with the same concept. Functionally, this will result in the same behavior and control chart
without the need to wait for a number of new measurements. This increases speed without
compromising the effectiveness of concept learning. The most recent alert is removed from
the current aggregate and saved as it will be placed into the next current aggregate. If the
aggregate ended due to small IAT, the two most recent alerts are removed instead. Figure 3.3
illustrates why this is done. Small IATs indicate that the previous alert occurred more closely
to the current alert than to the third most recent. Although the previous IAT did fall within
the control limit it is more intuitive to treat the two latest arrivals as the beginning of a new
aggregate as highlighted in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: New aggregate caused by small IAT

Before beginning a new aggregate, the now completed aggregate is matched with a tracked
concept using the KS-Test. The concept is then updated with all of the aggregate’s alert
timestamps, IATs, and EWMA statistics. After this a new aggregate is created and populated
with the saved alerts. By removing the need to wait for further measurements seen in the
TSSD-EWMA approach, CLEAR is able to process alerts as they arrive and detect changes in
behavior rapidly and confidently. An aggregate is ended with a delay of at most one additional
alert arrival, and learned concepts are tracked and updated with the end of each aggregate.

3.3.5

CLEAR vs. TSSD-EWMA

CLEAR expands upon the core EWMA control chart approach used by TSSD-EWMA and
makes a number of design decisions geared towards alert aggregation. CLEAR’s goal of aggregation differ slightly from standard drift detection, leading to unique design decisions compared
to TSSD-EWMA. The most notable difference between the two approaches is the concept learning engine in CLEAR. TSSD-EWMA manages a single control chart, which is discarded and
reconstructed after a shift is detected. CLEAR aims to learn the various temporal patterns
of IDS alerts as they may correspond to specific attacker actions, which will likely repeat over
time.
When a measurement falls outside of the CL in TSSD-EWMA, a number of future measurements
are collected and compared to historic measurements using the KS-Test to ensure a drift truly
occurred. By focusing its design on efficient aggregation, CLEAR does not need to wait for
future measurements. Instead CLEAR treats a potential change point as an end to the current
aggregate.
Cyber alert timestamps are measured in micro seconds, with IATs commonly measured at that
magnitude. It is also not uncommon for alert IATs to be large, many seconds, sometimes even
minutes or hours. Such a potential discrepancy requires additional consideration in control chart
construction. Intuitively, IATs in the micro second range should be treated less strictly than
those at larger magnitudes. The difference between 10 and 100 microseconds is significantly
different than 10 to 100 seconds for example. To accomodate this in control chart processing,
the 𝐶 𝐿 parameter 𝐿 was dynamically adjusted based on the IAT magnitude. Normally 𝐿 is
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set at 1.95, to allow for 2 standard deviations of error to still fall within the CL. CLEAR
further scales 𝐿 by up to 3 as the magnitude of IATs shrinks. This allows for more leniency in
aggregation for smaller IATs.

3.4

Design of Experiments

Our experiments aim to assess CLEAR’s ability to effectively correlate temporally near alerts
through aggregation. The TSSD-EWMA drift detection approach is used as the baseline for
comparison. We will assert three goals for CLEAR to achieve:
• Concepts learned by CLEAR are consistently “tight” within a stream, with a concept’s
IATs exhibiting smaller coefficient of variation compared to the baseline;
• Concepts learned by CLEAR are unique within a stream, resulting in high KS Distances
between them compared to the baseline;
• Analysis of alerts within concepts reveal certain signatures that exhibit consistent temporal patterns across individual IPs;

3.4.1

Dataset and Experimental Setup

The dataset used for this research consists of Suricata alerts collected during the 2018 National
Collegiate Penetration Testing Competition (CPTC) [41]. Eight teams were provided an identical network and were tasked with conducting penetration testing. A similar competition is
the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition [66] however there is not the same level of
alert generation, making it difficult to obtain as a full dataset.
The CPTC took place over the course of a single day from 8 AM until 6 PM with eight teams
competing. All traffic within each team’s network was passed through the Suricata [53] IDS
to generate alerts. Data streams were created by filtering alerts first by team and then by
source IP. By parsing the data in this way each stream can be interpreted as a single attacker’s
behavior as each team member is provided a single machine.
There were 127 total streams of data spread across the eight teams. Each stream was processed
independently by both CLEAR and TSSD-EWMA using a separate instantiation of each system.
Concepts learned in one stream were not applied to others. While it was not designed with
aggregation in mind, to mimic the aggregation of CLEAR the warnings raised by TSSD-EWMA
were interpreted as the end of aggregates. A window size of 15 alerts was used for testing if a
drift had occurred with the KS-Test in the TSSD-EWMA system.
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Experimental Hypothesis

Concept Coefficient of Variation
The learned concepts represent a specific temporal pattern exhibited by the alerts contained
within. While the non-temporal attributes of alerts within a concept may not be identical, it
is expected that the temporal characteristics are similar across all alerts. Therefore, concepts
should exhibit relatively ‘tight’ or consistent behavior throughout, represented by a low coefficient of variation CV. CV is defined in (3.7) where 𝜎 is the standard deviation of a sample and
𝜇 is the mean.
𝐶𝑉 =

𝜎
𝜇

(3.7)

If a concept captures consistent temporal patterns then the overall deviation of its measurements
should be minimal relative to their mean. A high measurement variance implies that the concept
captured too “vague” of a behavior, leading to unrelated alert groupings. The CV of all concepts
learned by CLEAR across all streams was recorded and is presented in the following section.

Concept Uniqueness
CLEAR aims to learn distinct and unique concepts within a single stream of intrusion alerts,
and therefore there should be minimal overlap in the IAT statistics of concepts. Each concept
should be statistically unique from all others within the same data stream. To measure this the
Two Sample KS-Test was applied to all concept pairs within a data stream; for each concept
the minimum distance to another concept in the stream was recorded. Whether or not the null
hypothesis of the Two Sample KS-Test could be rejected was also recorded for all concept pairs.
Ideally no two concepts should exist in a data stream that cannot reject the hypothesis as they
should represent different and unique arrival statistics.

Alert Signature’s Temporal Characteristics
The purpose of aggregation in CLEAR is to produce groups of temporally correlated alerts to
gain a better understanding of attack patterns within a network. After processing alerts and
learning the various concepts, the alert signatures were analyzed to find any that exhibited
consistent temporal patterns. In total there were 193 unique signatures contained within all
streams analyzed by CLEAR. To determine a potentially consistent signature, a probabilistic
approach was taken in analyzing the distribution of alerts within the concepts learned for a
stream. While no explicit ranking metric was used, a number of statistics were collected for
each signature such as:
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• The number of concepts containing a specific signature relative to the number of streams
it appeared in;
• The total number of alerts with that signature;
• The mean and standard deviation of all IATs within concepts containing the signature;

The rationale for using these statistics is that a signature with consistent temporal characteristics should be found in a limited number of concepts per stream. Looking at the overall concept
statistics allows for discovery of consistent signatures should CLEAR create temporally near or
overlapping concepts in a given stream.

3.5

Results and Discussions

Across all streams CLEAR generated 558 concepts while the TSSD-EWMA drift scheme only
generated 282. There were 69 streams in which the TSSD-EWMA system did not detect a new
concept, instead classifying all alerts in the stream into a single concept. This did not occur
for any of the streams processed by CLEAR. When analyzing concept uniqueness for TSSDEWMA, the streams with only 1 concept were not included as there was no other concept to
compare with using the two sample KS Test.

3.5.1

Concept Tightness with CLEAR

Figure 3.4 plots the coefficient of variation for all concepts learned by both approaches. CLEAR’s
concepts exhibit a much lower ratio on average indicating significantly “tighter” IAT statistics.
CLEAR concepts averaged a ratio of .864 while TSSD-EWMA resulted in an average ratio of
6.14. The concepts, and by extension the aggregates, learned by CLEAR show much more uniformity in their arrival patterns with each other compared to TSSD-EWMA. As CLEAR learns
from historic concepts it can quickly match recent observations with existing concepts. Low
coefficient of variation highlights CLEAR’s effectiveness aggregating alerts with similar arrival
patterns; if there were a significant number of outliers the CV would be higher.
CLEAR’s ability to generate such ‘tight’ concepts shows that it more effectively differentiates
uniform alert behavior patterns compared to TSSD-EWMA. This provides confidence that
any two aggregates from the same concept represent extremely similar temporal behaviors.
Aggregating alerts based on their arrival behavior leads to more clearly defined concepts which
inherently capture temporal correlation. Alerts in the same aggregate are temporally near and
exhibit similar arrival patterns. Further relationships found between alerts within a concept
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Figure 3.4: Concept means v. SD for both methods

give a better understanding of the potential actions an attacker may take given the temporal
characteristics of intrusion alerts.
The TSSD-EWMA constructs a new concept’s control chart around the first 𝑚 measurements
regardless of their similarity to one another allowing for significantly wider concepts. CLEAR
instead is able to apply historic control chart statistics to a new aggregate as early as the second alert, limiting the likelihood of highly variant IATs within a concept. In such a potentially
dynamic environment as cyber intrusion detection this weakness of TSSD-EWMA may be exacerbated as the data is generated from human driven actions which quickly change and adapt [57].
When analyzing individual alert signatures their temporal behaviors are better detailed by our
system. If a signature only occurs within a fixed arrival pattern it will be found in specific
CLEAR concepts. It is more difficult to isolate a specific signature’s temporal characteristics
from the TSSD-EWMA concepts as they are significantly broader.

3.5.2

Separation Across Concepts

For each stream, a scatter plot was generated matching the number of concepts in the stream
to the average of the minimum KS-Distances measured for each concept within the stream and
can be found in Figure 3.5. The figure summarizes the uniqueness of concept distributions
within each individual stream. Two non-unique concepts would have very similar statistical
distributions, which would lead to a smaller KS-Distance between them.
Streams processed by CLEAR resulted in higher statistical uniqueness between concepts than
those handled by TSSD-EWMA in spite of the fact that CLEAR on average produces more concepts per stream. For streams with an equivalent number of concepts across the two methods
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Figure 3.5: Total concepts v. avg. min. KS-Dist. in streams

in no cases does TSSD-EWMA produce concepts with higher average minimum KS-Distance
than CLEAR. Our system is able to learn more temporal concepts that are also more distinct
from one another. Knowing concepts are unique gives stronger context to additional relationships found between alerts. Correlations found across concepts indicate a behavior independent
of temporal patterns, while those found within a concept can be confidently said to have a
high dependence with the temporal arrival patterns of alerts. Concept uniqueness increases the
concentration of behaviors to single concepts within a stream.
Figure 3.6 expands on the uniqueness of concepts by comparing the overall distribution of
minimal KS-Distances between concepts. Each data point used to generate the histograms
represent the smallest KS-Distance between a single concept and all other concepts in the same
stream. A majority of CLEAR concepts have a minimum KS-Distance of .8 or greater from the
nearest concept, indicating nearly no overlap between most concepts. TSSD-EWMA concepts
show much more overlap in behaviors captured, with a majority measuring less than .4 from
their nearest concept. These results show the ability of CLEAR to learn distinct and unique
temporal behaviors within a data stream.
Even when looking at individual data streams CLEAR generates more unique concepts when
compared to the TSSD-EWMA method. For a majority of streams the TSSD-EWMA could not
detect a second concept, while CLEAR always produced at least two concepts. Considering that
alerts are derived from network traffic and that network traffic is inherently bursty and nonstationary [57], it is unrealistic to expect a stream should have only one concept. For streams
where the standard drift approach detected more than one concepts, 28.6% of concepts were
close enough to another that the null hypothesis could not be rejected; meaning it could not be
concluded that the two concepts were generated by different distributions. CLEAR concepts
saw only 14.3% of concepts unable to reject the null hypothesis, half the rate with more than
double the concepts when compared to the TSSD-EWMA approach.
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Figure 3.6: Min KS-Dist. between concepts for CLEAR (top) and TSSD-EWMA (bot)

Unlike in the TSSD-EWMA’s case however, the concepts that make up CLEAR’s 14.3% statistic
are either two small concepts or one large and one small concept. In the case of very small sample
sizes, it is nearly impossible to reject the null hypothesis for the KS-test as the critical distance
is very large. For CLEAR concepts that failed to be further from another concept than the
critical distance, marking them “similar;” the average critical value for the KS-test was .63.
In the case of TSSD-EWMA, the average critical value was .26; a substantially lower value.
This means that it was much easier on average for the concepts learned with the standard drift
method to be statistically different from each other, and yet similar concepts are still generated
by TSSD-EWMA at twice the rate of CLEAR.
To better illustrate the uniqueness of concepts learned by the two systems box plots were
generated over the IATs contained in the concepts of a single stream and are shown in Figure 3.7.
As shown TSSD-EWMA produces fairly homogeneous concepts over time with large amounts
of overlap while CLEAR produces distinct concepts with much lower deviation in the arrival
times contained.
TSSD-EWMA also lacks the ability to learn and update historic concepts, leading to seemingly
identical concepts being generated at different times in the stream. CLEAR’s concepts are
instead learned over time to ensure that they are representative of temporal behaviors captured
within alert aggregates. When analyzing signatures, it is important to know that individual
concepts within a stream are unique. If a signature only occurs in a single stream it exhibits
a very consistent temporal behavior. Such findings are strengthened when the same signature
is found in statistically similar concepts in multiple streams. Given the broad and overlapping
TSSD-EWMA concepts, it is difficult to draw any concrete conclusions from signature analysis.
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Figure 3.7: CLEAR (top) & TSSD-EWMA (bottom) concept IATs

3.5.3

Single Stream Results

To better visualize the performance of the aggregation methods, a single stream of data will be
used for the remaining discussion to better highlight the behavior of the various approaches.
Employing the TSSD-EWMA drift detection scheme detailed in [43] results in a smaller number
of Aggregates split over 2 concepts as shown in Figure 3.8. The graph shows the box plots of the
IATs in each of the aggregates generated by the system. In the figure there are multiple very
similar aggregates covering the same ranges of IATs for most of the stream, with little deviation
over time. Looking at these results, it seems as though the IATs for this specific dataset are
relatively uniform over time.
Arrival patters are not in fact uniform however as shown by a short period of aggregation
obtained when applying the CLEAR system to the stream in Figure 3.9. When analyzing new
data using historic learned concepts, the CLEAR system is able to quickly adapt to changes in
arrival patterns, separating arrivals into three unique concepts.
The aggregates in the figure averaged around 3 alerts each, further highlighting CLEAR’s
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Figure 3.8: Aggregates generated by TSSD-EWMA

Figure 3.9: Aggregates generated by CLEAR

reactivity. By applying known concept statistics to aggregation CLEAR is more sensitive to
sudden changes in arrival behavior. The CLEAR system is able to produce “tighter” and more
unique concepts that may otherwise be overlooked by traditional streaming drift detection
methods.
In such a fast changing environment this reactivity is key, and is a distinct weakness of the
TSSD-EWMA approach by comparison. Requiring a fixed number of new measurements after
a drift point means that it is possible that two or more unique concepts are merged together,
creating broad non-descriptive aggregates like those seen in Figure 3.8.

3.5.4

Temporally Correlated Alert Signatures

CLEAR’s unique and ‘tight’ concepts ensure alerts are aggregated based on their temporal
arrival patterns accurately. Further relationships and consistent characteristics of the alerts
contained can be found by analyzing concepts. This section investigates the alert signatures
contained in concepts learned by CLEAR and discusses some findings.
In the data streams processed by CLEAR there were 161 unique alert signatures. Individual
signatures appeared in an average of 7.68 streams and 14 concepts resulting in an average ratio
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of 1.83 concepts per stream. Signatures were analyzed based on their overall concentration of
alerts across streams. A selection of signatures and their corresponding statistics are presented in
Table 3.1. The means and standard deviation of IATs for the concepts containing the signatures
as well as the ratio of concepts containing the signature to streams containing the signature were
used to analyze how consistent a signature’s temporal characteristics were in the data. Since
CLEAR learns both “tight” and unique concepts, should a signature behave in a relatively
consistent temporal manner it should only appear in a small number of concepts in the streams
it is found in. While the ratio of concepts per streams was the primary factor in determining
concentration, the concept statistics and total number of alerts was also used to accommodate
the potential for a signature’s temporal range to be wider than that of a single concept learned
by CLEAR.
3.1: Signature
rankings based
on various
Sig. Table
Abbr.(ID)
Conc./Stream
Alerts
𝜇 IATstatistics
𝜎 IAT
SQLAISA(170)

1

13

0.3 ms

N/A

PHPENV(91)

1

34

6.9 ms

0.38 ms

ETWSH(33)

1.5

122

4.38 ms

2.33 ms

ETWS(34)

1.5

122

4.38 ms

2.33 ms

MONGOVR(14)

1.25

45

3.94 ms

14.9 ms

MONGODER(15)

1.25

46

3.94 ms

14.9 ms

PHPINJ(80)

6

111

27.5 ms

39.6 ms

PSSQLSCAN(6)

2.3

966

15.72 s

40.3 s

OSSCAN(9)

1.6

441

0.33 s

0.44 s

CURL(22)

1

116

0.5 s

4.9 s

RFI ATT.(116)

1

1

56.4 ms

N/A

Alert Signatures with Consistent Arrival Patterns
Figure 3.10 shows the box plots of the concepts containing the signature “ET WEB SERVER
PHP ENV SuperGlobal in URI”(PHPENV(91)) across the data streams that contain it. This
signature appeared in a single stream of each of two teams and is most likely used as part of
a vulnerability injection. Both concepts exhibit nearly identical IAT statistics and contain the
same 12 signatures. This is strong evidence of the same action being taken by both teams, most
likely an identical script or exploit.
Another signature that exhibits consistent temporal characteristics is “ET WEB SERVER Possible MySQL SQLi Attempt Information Schema Access” (SQLAISA(170)). This signature is
usually part of a SQL injection attempt, and was used by one team multiple times over the
course of the competition. Although the injection attempts were made hours apart from one
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Figure 3.10: Concepts containing “ET WEB SERVER PHP ENV SuperGlobal in URI” (PHPENV(91))

another, CLEAR classified all alerts with the signature into the same concept. This result
highlights the effectiveness of CLEAR’s concept tracking and matching with aggregates.

Co-occurring Alert Signatures
It was not uncommon to find groups of signatures where all alerts were aggregated into the same
concepts. Usually these signatures were very closely related (GPL WEB SERVER service.cnf
access, GPL WEB SERVER services.cnf access and GPL WEB SERVER writeto.cnf access)
and only occurred once or twice across all datasets.
A pair of alerts warning of Mongo database version and database enumeration requests were
seen in streams of members from seven teams. The signatures “ETPRO ATTACK RESPONSE
MongoDB Version Request” (MONGOVR(14)) & “ETPRO ATTACK RESPONSE MongoDB
Database Enumeration Request” (MONGODER(15)) were found together in the same 20 concepts within 16 streams. The signatures detail two unique requests to a Mongo database and
occur in near equal numbers (45 vs. 46 alerts respectively) and with similar and mostly consistent timing patterns. Nearly all concepts containing the signatures exhibited microsecond IAT
statistics; though one concept was in the sub-second range.
Similar behavior was observed between the signatures “ET WEB SERVER Possible CVE2014-6271 Attempt” (ETWS(34)) and “ET WEB SERVER Possible CVE-2014-6271 Attempt
in Headers” (ET-WSH (33)). Both signatures occurred in pairs of alerts throughout the two
data streams that they appeared in across two unique teams. This behavior is unique, as
there were other streams that contained only the signature ETWSH(33) without the other. All
concept means fall between 1 and 6 milliseconds which is very consistent across streams and
teams.

Alerts with Multiple Distinct Arrival Patterns
Scanning is an extremely common, near constant passive action taken by many entities. Given
its nature it is not surprising to find that most scanning signatures, such as “ET SCAN Suspi-
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cious inbound to PostgreSQL port 5432” (PSSQLSCAN(6)), are found in a number of concepts
with varying timing characteristics. Interestingly however another type of scanning, “ET SCAN
NMAP OS Detection Probe” (OSSCAN(9)) was used by 6 teams in one of two distinct “modes”
with unique timing characteristics. Figure 3.11 shows the concepts containing the signature; no
single stream contained concepts from both modes.

Figure 3.11: Concepts containing signature “ET SCAN NMAP OS Detection Probe” (OSSCAN(9))
The specific operating mode likely depends on surrounding attacker actions. This could be due
to difference in target OS, the parameters used by the attacker or a complementary action being
executed in parallel.

3.6

Concluding Remarks and Future Work

The CLEAR system is able to intelligently aggregate non-stationary streaming alerts through
efficient concept learning and matching of arrivals. It learns concepts that exhibit significantly
less variation and more unique distributions when compared to the TSSD-EWMA process.
Intrusion alert IATs grouped into concepts exhibit a standard deviation that is on average less
than the concept’s mean. TSSD-EWMA concepts on average have a tightness ratio that is 7.1
times greater than CLEAR. Furthermore, the concepts learned by CLEAR are significantly more
unique than those learned by TSSD-EWMA. On average, CLEAR concepts are twice as distant
from others within the same stream than those learned by TSSD-EWMA when measured by the
two-sample KS-Test. CLEAR is not limited in its change point detection and can quickly detect
changes in stationarity correctly without waiting for additional arrivals. By quickly matching
alert aggregates to the optimally matched concept in near real-time, CLEAR reveals attack
behaviors exhibited by temporally related intrusion alerts.
As demonstrated in the experiments conducted using CPTC 2018 intrusion alerts, CLEAR is
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able to identify specific attack action signatures with similar temporal characteristics. A number
of signatures were found in concepts with consistent arrival patterns across multiple streams and
teams. Groups of signatures such as ETWS(34) and ETWSH (33) always appeared in concepts
together, also across multiple team’s data streams. Some signatures exhibited multiple ‘modes’
of operation, i.e., different alert arriving speeds. These results highlight the value of CLEAR,
which produces the temporal context of intrusion activities. Extracting related alert signatures
from temporal proximity and arrival patterns helps to provide security analysts broader insights
on attack behavior: which attack actions are likely to co-occur together and at what inter-arrival
time. Such insights can be helpful to effectively determine when, where and how to interrupt a
cyberattack campaign.
In this work, alert signatures exhibiting consistent temporal behavior were extracted through
manual analysis of concept statistics. Just as it is infeasible for an analyst to process the
overwhelming number of alerts quickly, they cannot be expected to manually parse all of the
individual concepts learned within a network. Aggregates are groups of alerts exhibiting similar
timing patterns, but what deeper relationships, if any, are present? Analysts are interested in
understanding which IDS alert signatures co-occur with one another during specific attacker
actions. Additional mechanisms to extract potential signature patterns from aggregates would
further benefit analysts.

Chapter 4

R-CAD
4.1

Introduction

Cyber analysts can be quickly overwhelmed by the number of intrusion detection system (IDS)
alerts generated within their network. IDS alert signatures attempt to describe attacker actions
but there are many unique signatures. Analysts are most concerned with a small number of
“critical” signatures that detail severe malicious action against a network such as data loss
or injection. These critical alerts occur very infrequently but are of the highest importance
and interest to analysts. To better understand these critical alerts analysts are interested in
knowing if there are any patterns among IDS alert signatures that contain critical signatures.
Do attacker actions cause specific pairs or groups of alerts to co-occur together with regularity? Understanding these inter alert correlations, the attacker actions they represent and the
temporal patterns they exhibit, would provide deep insights and advantages to analysts when
defending a network. The CLEAR system quickly processes incoming alerts and aggregates
them based on their arrival times. This inherently relates groups of temporally near alerts, but
further analysis is required to find any persistent patterns between specific signatures across
aggregates within a network.
Alert correlation approaches are more focused on discovering relationships based on a priori
expert knowledge, or classifying a number of alert attributes using extensive training sets.
Alert aggregation methods look to group similar alerts happening in near temporal proximity to
reduce the overall count but these methods are focused on removing “duplicate” or “redundant”
alerts. This work instead aims to process alerts in real time to capture the series of attack
episodes and extract co-occurring signature relationships from them. Solving this problem is
not straightforward and to the author’s knowledge no research has put forth a method for
processing alerts in this way. Alerts are generated quickly and in great number. It is not
54
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uncommon for larger networks to generate hundreds of thousands if not millions of alerts per
day, with successive alerts occurring within mili- or even microseconds of one another. Through
analysis of real world cyber event datasets the observation was made that cyber data exhibits
regularly changing temporal patterns. Grouping alerts based on these patterns would provide
“episodes” of alerts likely borne from an attack action. Analyzing similar episodes gathered
across the network would then produce the desired co-occurrence relationships critical signatures
have and their temporal properties.
The Concept Learning for Intrusion Event Aggregation in Realtime (CLEAR) [65] aggregates
alerts in near-real time and with no training data based on their temporal arrival patterns.
This work leverages CLEAR, treating its produced aggregates as attack episodes. Co-occurring
attack actions are extracted from these episodes in the presented Rare yet Co-occurring Attack
action Discovery (R-CAD)s system. CLEAR’s episodes are merged by R-CAD to create network
wide “attack speeds,” collections of statistically similar attack episodes from across a network.
To extract potential relationships from the episodes pattern mining techniques [69] are applied.
Given the high number of alerts and episodes a focused and constrained sequence database
(SDB) construction approach is taken to reduce performance overhead without compromising
statistical integrity of results. To ensure that relationships relevant to the analyst are found a
unique combination of a number of metrics are applied to any potential rule to find “strong”
rules; those detailing signature co-occurrences that are statistically dependent on one another.
Additional metrics are used on these strong rules to provide a wider context to a specific
signature and its use within a network.
The main contributions of this work are:
• A novel method to sequence episodes of network alerts from individual IP streams into
network wide “attack speeds” which can be used for SDBs for pattern mining application.
• A novel approach to extract “strong” relationships between signatures describing both
co-occurrence and temporal separation.
• A set of unique metrics to characterize, prioritize and visualize signature relationships to
an analyst. Results explore how these further benefit an analyst.

4.2

Related Work

IDS systems are used to raise alerts to network administrators of suspected anomalous or
malicious activity [28]. Quickly and effectively processing the extreme number of alerts in
order to construct a clear and unified knowledge of a network’s security status is necessary for
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defense [15, 29] . A simple and straightforward way to reduce the overall number of alerts is
through aggregation [25]. Alerts of the same type occurring close with one another are removed.
The intuition here is that they are generated by ongoing activity, e.g, scanning, or alerts that
are generated from the same activity by multiple scanners [24]. Traditional aggregation aims
to remove ‘redundant’ alerts [52] but provides no deeper insight into the alerts presented to an
analyst. Standard aggregation approaches do not produce groups of related yet unique alerts
needed by this work to create attack episodes.
Alert correlation methods aim to process cyber alerts and provide deeper meaning to them [32].
Some early approaches provided modeling languages that allowed users to define known attack
scenarios [12]. These types of approaches require a large, manually defined set of training
patterns [44]. There is high overhead in creating such a dataset, especially when one considers
that there are always new and emerging attack patterns. Machine learning techniques have
been used to learn attack scenarios [13] or to reconstruct incoming alerts to previously clustered
alerts [51], however these methods are still dependent on manual labeling of training data [32].
Rule-based approaches attempt to match prerequisite and consequent actions to cyber attack
steps [11], but these too require specific attack knowledge and are unable to detect emerging
attacks as they are not defined in the rules database.
Statistically driven approaches to alert correlation attempt to determine relationships across
alerts without prior domain knowledge [32]. In [42] a Bayesian model was generated over “hyper alerts.” Hyper alert construction leverages many basic alert aggregation principles, collecting
all alerts with identical attributes such as source and destination IP and signature. Conditional
probabilities are then calculated for each pair of hyper alerts in an attempt to produce a causal
relationship between alerts. This approach was iterated upon in [44] to provide “online” alert
correlation however the approach still required extensive off-line Bayesian training using large
sets of hyper alerts. There is little focus on the temporal aspect of individual alerts and relationships that can be extracted from them. Many alert correlation techniques use some type of
windowing when processing new alerts [17]. Alert occurrence frequencies are used when determining relationships across alert types, but the temporal relationships across alerts usually are
not used in alert correlation.
This work focuses on this gap in research to find meaningful temporal relationships between
signatures co-occurring together within attack episodes. Other work in the area has shown
evidence of temporal relationships in cyber attack data. ARIMA models provided a boost in
accuracy when forecasting cyber event counts [63]. Hourly counts of individual signatures have
been leveraged to detect abnormalities in occurrence rates [58]. Weekly analysis of malicious
activity against a commercial entity found seasonal behavior, and changes in intensity over the
course of a day or week [64]. By processing alerts in such a way that these relationships are
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not only captured but leveraged, strong understanding of attack actions and alert signature
co-occurrences can be extracted from the data.
Researchers in [65] are the first to our knowledge to incorporate statistically driven aggregation
of alerts based on their arrival patterns. Aggregation leveraged the notion of concept drift,
the phenomena where the distributions or relationships across features change over time [34].
These changes can happen gradually or suddenly, and are very common in network traffic
and other human driven systems [57]. Few, if any, other alert correlation approaches contain
mechanisms to adapt to such changes. The aggregates generated by this system are an intuitive
way of capturing attack episodes. Manual analysis of temporal “concepts” found signatures
with consistent temporal properties in multiple IP streams of alerts, but no formal method was
presented to programatically extract signature relationships from the data. This work presents
such a method, applying pattern mining techniques to the alert signatures captured within
similar attack episodes. Attack episodes are statistically grouped to represent specific temporal
attack speeds present within a network.
It is difficult to apply data mining techniques to cyber alert data given the amount of data and
difficulty in appropriately sequencing alerts. An early application of pattern mining on alert data
[55] constructed directed graphs based on the source and destination IPs of alerts. Sequences
were found however no further processing was done to find association rules. Association rules
provide additional insights into sequences showing a direct relationship between an antecedent
and consequent. The most basic metric used in mining association rules is the confidence, though
additional metrics should be used to ensure rules are pertinent to a particular research question
[27]. Given identical parameters and sequences, different pattern mining algorithms will produce
identical results. While performance can be optimized for different database constraints [19],
the outcome cannot. It is with what metrics the discovered sequences and association rules are
processed that gives an understanding of the relationships within the data.
The size of alert datasets can cause extreme pattern mining overheads as explored in [26].
While the efficacy of the algorithms was not explored the performance results showed both
that such algorithms can be run in an on-line manner with low performance overhead and
that sequential database construction can severely impact performance to the point that online
operation is infeasible. Interest in sequences containing rare items increases overhead as the
minimum support used must be set lower, increasing the number of subsequences processed.
Generally this is avoided by using non-frequent pattern mining algorithms, which instead utilize
a maximum support threshold. This work however is interested in finding frequent patterns
relative to the occurrence of infrequent items. To our knowledge such an approach to SDB
processing does not exist. As this work is not focused on the creation of a novel pattern mining
algorithm, instead a constrained SDB construction approach is used to allow for relevant sub
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sequences to be found using traditional methods without severe overhead incurred.

4.3

R-CAD Architecture

The Rare yet Co-occurring Attack action Discovery (R-CAD) system leverages and expands on
the Concept Learning for Intrusion Event Aggregation in Realtime (CLEAR) [65] approach to
alert aggregation to create alert episodes. From these episodes R-CAD uses pattern mining techniques to extract co-occurrences quickly thanks to its unique constrained SDB construction. The
statistics describing co-occurrences within episodes are further processed to determine which
signatures, if any, are correlated. Using the metrics of Lift (4.5) and critical confidence (4.6),
“strong” rules and relationships can be found which indicate statistically strong, dependent and
driven co-occurrences of specific alert signatures within specific attack speeds. Additional metrics are also used to provide deeper insights to the rule in the context of the critical signature
across the entire network to better help anaylsts. An illustration of the R-CAD and CLEAR
architecture is shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Flowchart of IDS Alerts Through R-CAD and CLEAR Architecture

4.3.1

Extracting Attack Episodes and Attack Speeds

The CLEAR system presented in [65] is leveraged to extract attack episodes from streams of cyber alerts. By applying experimentally weighted moving average (EWMA) control charts to the
series of alert timestamps CLEAR aggregates alerts based on the stationarity of their interarrival times (IATs). Aggregates are produced for each individual external source IP or internal
target IP to capture arrival patterns for “individuals” within a network. CLEAR’s learning
engine also builds overall “concepts” within each stream which are collections of statistically
similar episodes. CLEAR processes only the timestamp of alerts, no other attributes. While
it can reveal temporal relationships across alerts further processing is needed to relate specific
actions to one another. R-CAD ingests episodes produced by CLEAR and further processes the
signature data to discover strong co-occurrence relationships found consistently within episodes
of specific attack speeds.
To effectively analyze attack actions from across a network, R-CAD merges the concepts from
individual attack streams into overarching attack speeds. By grouping similar attack actions
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from across a network persistent co-occurrence relationships can be extracted. The two-sample
KS-Test is used to compare two concepts for potential merging [31] as defined in Equation (4.1).
It finds the maximum distance between the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of the log
quantized interarrival times of the attack episodes within individual stream concepts.

𝐷 𝐾 𝑆 = 𝑠𝑢 𝑝 𝑥 |𝐶𝐷𝐹1 (𝑥) − 𝐶𝐷𝐹2 (𝑥)|

(4.1)

If the distance between the two sample CDFs are less than a critical distance approximated [21]
based on sample sizes as shown in Equation (4.2) the two samples are considered drawn from
the same distribution. When this is the case the attack episodes within are collected together
into a single “attack speed.”

𝐷 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡

√︂
𝑛1 + 𝑛2
= 1.36
𝑛1 𝑛2

(4.2)

This process is repeated for all streams to create general attack speeds found within a network.
Individual attack episodes are maintained and unchanged to be pattern mined as sequences.
Each attack speed is treated as an individual SDB and is processed separately by R-CAD to
ensure that co-occurrences are found exhibiting similar attack speeds. As attack episodes are extracted from alert streams it is important to understand the context of the streams used. Using
individual external IPs will generate episodes capturing a single external entity’s actions. Conversely, using internal device IPs reveal signature relationships from multiple external sources
targeting the same internal device. This consideration must be made when determining how
R-CAD will convert IDS alerts into streams for processing.

4.3.2

Understanding Streams and Their Impact

Which alerts R-CAD processes will change the potential relationships found. CLEAR was
developed to process individual event streams, but generally. It is up to the user of the system
to determine how events, in this case IDS alerts, are ingested. How alert streams are constructed
will inherently affect the signature relationships found by R-CAD, and what they mean in the
context of cyber defense. In this work, three stream constructions are used, external source
IP, external autonomous system number (ASN) and internal destination IP. Analysts want to
understand how specific malicious individuals are attacking their network. Source IP streams
were used in the previous chapter with the CPTC dataset as they were known to be used by
a single individual team member. Processing the stream of alerts originating from a single
external IP in that context gives a clear timeline of each competetor’s actions over the course
of the competition. In a live environment it is common for attackers to attempt to obfuscate
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their IP address, making multiple connections from multiple spoofed addresses. Here, source
IP streams may not fully capture a single user’s actions. Single malicious IP addresses usually
do not persist within a target network for long. In the real world dataset analyzed for this
work, many IP addresses generated alerts over a very short time window, usually only a few
minutes. Most IPs also only generated a small number of unique IDS alert signatures. Given
these two characteristics, it is very likely that multiple IPs were used by the same attacker to
carry out different steps of their attack. To account for this ASNs can be used to relate multiple
IPs to a single entity. While it is impossible to know if each ASN accurately maps each IP to
the correct entity, using ASN streams gives a wider context of alerts. Given the uncertainty
of mapping external IPs to specific entities, internal target based IP streams can also be used.
In this context each stream represents the activity targeting specific pieces of infrastructure,
irrespective of who was doing the targeting. Constructing streams in this way allows an analyst
to find patterns among alerts targeting integral infrastructure in their network.
Figure 4.2 shows how IDS alerts are ingested by R-CAD to learn attack speeds which can be
processed to find signature co-occurrence relationships. R-CAD ingests individual streams of
alerts and processes them with CLEAR to learn concepts unique to those streams. Concepts
from all streams are then merged together to create attack speeds made up of statistically
similar concepts from individual streams. Processing alerts in this way maintains the individual
episodes of alerts that were extracted from specific users or from actions targeting specific
infrastructure. The cross stream attack speeds can be processed by R-CAD to find persistent
signature relationships found in multiple individual streams at similar temporal speeds.

Figure 4.2: Illustration of stream based alert processing from IDS to R-CAD attack speeds
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Finding Signature Relationships

IDS alerts are strong candidates for the application of pattern mining techniques. They are
temporally marked events and follow a sequential order. The individual episodes produced
by CLEAR can be treated as sequences and mined for frequently occurring patterns. The
constrained SPADE (cSPADE) algorithm [69] is well suited for processing these sequences.
cSPADE is designed to process sequential patterns and can account for multiple events occuring
with the same timestamp. It is very common for an IDS alert to be a false positive [17]. This
can cause noise in the sequence. cSPADE’s allowance for gaps when pattern mining will account
for and discard any noise between the two signature occurrences.
cSPADE processes a sequence data base (SDB) containing 𝑁 sequences 𝑆. Each sequence 𝑆𝑖 is
made up of individual events 𝑆𝑖 = 𝑒 𝑖,1 , 𝑒 𝑖,2 , ...𝑒 𝑖,𝑛 . Each event contains items 𝑖 𝑚 ∈ 𝐼 which all
occur at time 𝑡 𝑛 . Sequences are temporally ordered 𝑒 𝑖,𝑎 , 𝑒 𝑖,𝑏 , 𝑡 𝑎 < 𝑡 𝑏 . cSPADE finds all subsequences 𝑠 ⊆ 𝑆 which which are “frequent”. A sub-sequence’s support 𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑠), or frequency, is
the rate of sequences in the SDB that contain it. Support is defined in (4.3), where 𝐴 is a given
sub sequence and 𝑁 is the number of sequences in the SDB. For a sub-sequence to be frequent
its support must be higher than a user set threshold.
Frequent sequences are used to derive association rules [22]. An association rule 𝐴 → 𝐵 describes
the directional temporal relationship of two sub-sequences. Rules also have a support 𝑆𝑢 𝑝( 𝐴 →
𝐵) which is the rate of sequences containing the rule. The rate of occurrence of 𝐵 given the
occurrence of 𝐴 is the confidence, defined in (4.4).

𝑆𝑢 𝑝 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝑆𝑢 𝑝( 𝐴) =

𝐶𝑜𝑛 𝑓 ( 𝐴 → 𝐵) =

𝐴
𝑁

𝑆𝑢 𝑝( 𝐴 → 𝐵)
𝑆𝑢 𝑝( 𝐴)

(4.3)

(4.4)

For a given critical signature 𝑋 an analyst is interested in discovering another signature 𝑌 that
occurs in the same attack action as 𝑋 consistently and with statistical dependence. Such a
Δ

relationship can be denoted as 𝑋 −
→ 𝑌 where Δ represents the temporal latency between the two
signature occurrences. Note that in the case of a negative Δ value the critical signature occurs
after the co-occurring signature.
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Constrained SDB Generation

To reduce computational complexity and overhead of pattern mining a constrained approach is
used when constructing SDBs. As analysts are explicitly concerned with specific signatures it
is unnecessary to include any sequences that do not contain them. Figure 4.3 shows the size
reduction of SDBs when only episodes containing the critical signature are included for the
CPTC dataset. In nearly all cases the critical signature was present in fewer than 10% of all
episodes in an attack speed and on average, it was in fewer than 6%.

Figure 4.3: Plot of SDB size reduction for all CPTC Attack Speeds
The effect of such SDB construction is two-fold, as now each signature contains the critical signature, the frequency of all sub-sequences are contextualized to episodes containing the critical
signature. This allows a reasonable threshold to be set for cSPADE while still ensuring that
frequent patterns containing the rare critical signature will be found. To ensure the relevant
statistics are still correctly measured, support and confidence values produced by cSPADE are
adjusted to account for the total number of episodes in each attack speed.

4.3.5

Metrics to Find Strong Rules

A frequent pattern or association rule extracted through pattern mining is not necessarily
pertinent or interesting to the problem at hand [27]. Further metrics are required to provide
such insights which must be tailored to the context and problem [22]. A number of metrics
describing unique characteristics of a signature relationship are employed to ensure that a rule
Δ

is “strong” and therefore worth prioritizing and presenting to an analyst. Each rule 𝑋 −
→𝑌
produced through pattern mining is processed and categorized based on statistics associated
with each signature. Each rule occurrence is processed independently for each attack speed it
exhibits. Only rules appearing in at least three episodes within an attack speed are considered.
The first metric used to determine rule strength is lift which is described in (4.5). Lift 𝐿
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measures the occurrence dependency between both parts of a rule. A value greater than one
implies that the appearance of both signatures within the same episode is directly correlated
and did not happen by chance. A high lift value indicates statistical co-occurrence

𝐿=

𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋 → 𝑌 )
𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋) · 𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑌 )

(4.5)

Analysts are most interested in relationships that are regular and consistent in their occurrence
relative to the critical signature. Standard confidence calculations are taken relative to the
antecedent. Confidence with respect to the critical, or critical confidence 𝛼 𝑥 , is used to determine
the confidence of co-occurrence given the critical signature and attack speed.

𝛼𝑋 (𝑋 → 𝑌 ) =

𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋 → 𝑌 )
𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋)

(4.6)

Rules that exhibit high lift and critical confidence are considered “strong” and worth presenting
to an analyst. Individual strong rules can only provide insights into a relationship as it is
exhibited in a specific attack speed. To give deeper context to strong rules and the critical
signature in general further characteristics are measured. These can be used to help an analyst
prioritize and categorize strong rules found across a number of critical signatures.
Attack speed uniformity 𝑈𝑆 and temporal latency Δ both describe the temporal characteristics of
the signature relationship. Attack speed uniformity measures the deviations in the attack speeds
containing the rule. The average log quantized alert interarrival time is taken for each speed
and the deviations across speeds are recorded. The temporal latency measures the mean time
elapsed between the occurrences of the critical and co-occurring signature within individual
episodes Δ 𝑥 𝑦 = |𝑡 𝑥 − 𝑡 𝑦 |. These characteristics provide context towards potential alert noise
present between the two signature occurrences, as well as potential consistency in co-occurrence
timing even across highly variable attack speeds.
Rule prevalence Φ 𝑥 𝑦 gives deeper context to the rule’s occurrence relative to the critical signature’s occurrence across all attack speeds. All attack episodes in the network are analyzed
to find the total number containing the critical signature and those containing the rule. The
ratio of the two is taken as described in (4.7). A rule with high prevalence is one that should
be expected given the occurrence of the critical signature, while a low prevalence indicates that
the critical signature occurs in other attack speeds where this relationship was not present.

Φ𝑥 𝑦 =

𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋 → 𝑌 ) 𝐴𝑆
𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋 𝑁 )

(4.7)
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Rule bi-directionally 𝑋 ↔ 𝑌 assesses the strength of the rule from the perspective of the cooccurring signature. Given the rarity of critical signatures it is likely that the co-occurring
signature appears more frequently within the dataset. While the lift metric is symmetrical, the
critical confidence used to determine if a rule is strong is taken relative to the critical signature.
In the case where signature 𝑌 occurs more frequently within an attack speed compared to 𝑋 this
will result in a lower confidence and potentially disqualify the rule 𝑌 → 𝑋 from being strong.

𝑋 ↔𝑌 =

4.4
4.4.1

𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋 → 𝑌 ∧ 𝑌 → 𝑋)
𝑆𝑢 𝑝(𝑋 → 𝑌 )

(4.8)

Analyzing Network Activity with R-CAD
Experimental datasets

R-CAD was used to process two unique datasets; one collected during a penetration testing
competition and another gathered in a real world security operations center (RSOC) network.
After exploration of both datasets it is clear that they exhibit different alert characteristics and
that each dataset can provide unique insights into attack behavior and R-CAD’s ability to find
interesting signature relationships.
Initial experiments were conducted over the 2018 National Collegiate Penetration Testing Competition (CPTC) [41] dataset. CPTC is a yearly collegiate competition where a number of
teams execute penetration testing operations against a “client” network. There were eight
teams competing with each provided identical personal and target networks. Over the course of
the competition nearly 200,000 cyber alerts were generated across all teams. Experiments were
also conducted on a week of Suricata alerts generated by an institutional cyber network and
SOC operation. The network is much larger in scope seeing over six hundred thousand alerts per
day on average across hundreds of unique external and internal IP addresses. Table 4.1 shows a
breakdown of the alerts contained in the two datasets. Note that the CPTC competition lasted
approximately 10 hours, while the RSOC dataset was collected over the course of a work week.
Figure 4.4 shows the breakdown of alerts unique to each dataset and appearing in both.
Table 4.1: Summary Results for Stream Configurations
Dataset Alerts
Unique Sigs. Sigs/stream Crit. Sigs.
CPTC

170192

245

51.7

67

RSOC

3122206

149

4.1

27

The CPTC set sees many more unique alerts likely due to the network intentionally having
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unpatched vulnerabilities for the teams to find and exploit across a number of server and device
types. Teams do not make efforts to obfuscate their actions through multiple or spoofed IP
addresses. While there is some team-wide coordination, it can be safely assumed that each
individual IP address represents a single team member and their actions. This makes an ideal
dataset to explore R-CAD’s ability to find rare co-occurrences. To the authors’ knowledge there
is no publicly available dataset which maps cyber intrusion alerts to known and documented
attacker actions. The CPTC dataset can be treated as a pseudo ground truth, validating R-CAD
through intuitive relationships found. Alert streams were created using the team’s external IP
addresses.

Figure 4.4: Piechart breaking down alert signatures by dataset
IP spoofing is very common with most external IP addresses in the RSOC dataset generating
only a single unique alert signature. ASN values are generated by analysts which attempt to
map multiple IPs to the same “entity.” It is impossible to know how accurate ASN mappings
are. This uncertainty could lead to R-CAD’s results not truly capturing relationships between
an attacker’s actions. Constructing streams over known internal IPs allows R-CAD to detect
potential attacks targeting specific infrastructure within the network. The RSOC dataset saw
fewer unique signatures overall. This is unsurprising as a live network is likely more secured with
fewer unpatched vulnerabilities. The CPTC competition’s purpose is penetration testing across
a large and architecturally diverse network. Competitors are much more aggressive and employ
more and varied attacks compared to a live environment. For stream episodes to accurately
describe actions in the context of a specific “entity” it is important to assess overall network
knowledge, and tailor stream generation.
Each dataset also has unique temporal characteristics as shown by the attack speeds found by
R-CAD in Figure 4.5. While some attack speed ranges overlap with each other the distributions
of IATs within significantly differ from one speed to the next, preventing merging. The RSOC
network sees slower attack speeds, with a number of them having IATs of over 100 seconds.
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The CPTC competition takes place in a quarantined “local” network, requiring less routing and
therefore leading to faster attack speeds overall. While these networks are different from one
another these timing differences show the importance of using historical network traffic to find
alert relationships. Different networks can cause different timing profiles as well as unique alert
relationships as an attacker will adjust their actions to the network architecture. For simplicity,
signature names discussed are abbreviated. Appendix A.2 details the full signature names for
each abbreviation used in the following discussions.

Figure 4.5: Attack speeds for datasets processed by R-CAD

4.4.2

R-CAD value with CPTC

R-CAD processed alert streams constructed over external IP addresses for all teams in the
CPTC competition. On average across all attack speeds critical signatures appeared in alert
episodes with 19.5 other unique signatures producing over 1500 potential rules. These rules are
aggregated and post-processed by R-CAD using the metrics previously described. In total, 53
strong rules were found derived from 24 unique critical signatures and 29 unique co-occurring
signatures.
Radar charts measuring three additional statistics are presented to help quickly and visually
“rank” strong rules. Rules are found per attack speed; while a rule may be present and strong in
a specific attack speed that does not mean the critical signature or relationship only occurs there.
These additional metrics help analysts understand the relationship in the greater context of the
critical signature within the network. All strong rules are statistically meaningful dependent
relationships and co-occurrences within their specific attack speeds; potential low measurements
for these additional metrics do not indicate otherwise.
Six strong rules were found with very high values for all additional metrics under consideration.
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The first can be seen in Figure 4.6 which describes the rule “ADOBE RFI → ACHIEVO RFI.”
Both signatures describe attempted remote file inclusion attempts against Adobe and Achievo
servers using php vulnerabilities. Given the strong relationship and the uniformity in attack
speed it is likely that these signatures are borne from a script that attempts to inject a malicious
file into any found php servers. High values for the three metrics in the radar charts conveys to
an analyst that the co-occurrence should be expected any time either signature is found. High
𝑈𝑠 indicates that the rule is found in temporally consistent episodes.

Figure 4.6: Radar chart for rule with uniformly good attributes
Figure 4.7 shows the radar chart for the rule “TECH RFI → SKEL RFI.” In addition to their
strong bidirectional relationship both signatures are critical. Each signature describes a remote
file inclusion attempt against different components of a content management system. Similar to
the previous rule this is likely borne from an attacker attempting remote file inclusion against
a found content management system within the network.
The four remaining strong rules all pertain to remote file inclusion attempts against various
components of a Mambo or Joomla content management system. For all four rules the time
between critical and co-occurring signature Δ is in the range of 30-60 ms, indicating very similar
attack speeds. Given the high scores in all ranking metrics it is likely these rules derive from
a script aiming to exploit known vulnerabilities. One of the four strong rules, shown in Figure
4.8 describes a relationship between two critical signatures “KOERFI” and “SMFRFI”.
Rules were found in episodes generated by all teams, in concepts that were all temporally similar.
Figure 4.9 shows the CLEAR concepts from individual streams containing the “KOERFI” and
“SMFRFI” signatures. Both signatures appear in episodes together and in a tight temporal
range in all but one instance across the competition. Team members were clearly enacting a
similar or identical script exploiting vulnerabilities that allow for remote file inclusion attacks.
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Figure 4.7: Radar chart for rule with uniformly good attributes

Figure 4.8: Rule with high additional metrics between 2 critical signatures

Finding such a number of strong rules with consistent timing and co-occurrence across teams
shows that there are signature relationships generated by attacker actions and that they can be
found by R-CAD. Given the absence of ground truth knowledge of all signature relationships,
it is difficult to know how comprehensive these rules are. Potential future work could generate
such a dataset and apply R-CAD to it to better understand its effectiveness.
Further analysis of signatures covered by strong rules can reveal other meaningful relationships
present. Table 4.2 shows a selection of signature relationships found by R-CAD for the two
critical signatures. Note these are not all strong rules due to low 𝛼 𝑥 measurements however all
have 𝐿 > 1. The first row details the rule with both critical signatures, while rows two through
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Figure 4.9: Individual stream concepts containing signatures “KOERFI” and “SMFRFI”

five detail a pair of co-occurring signatures shared by both critical signatures. In nearly all attack
episodes containing both critical signatures, the signatures “CHTRFI” and “PHPINJ” are also
co-occurring with high statistical significance. “CHTRFI” describes a remote file injection
against the Ajax Chat component of a Joomla server, while “PHPINJ” describes a PHP injection
attack against a web server.
Table 4.2: Detailed Co-Occurring Signature Statistics
Rule
Eps. 𝛼 𝑥
𝜇 L Φ𝑥 𝑦
KOERFI []33𝑚𝑠 SMFRFI
19𝑚𝑠

KOERFI −−−−→ PHPINJ
−22𝑚𝑠

SMFRFI −−−−−→ PHPINJ
−29𝑚𝑠

KOERFI −−−−−→ CHTRFI
−56𝑚𝑠

SMFRFI −−−−−→ CHTRFI
−15𝑚𝑠

KOERFI −−−−−→ IISACC
31𝑚𝑠

SMFRFI −−−−→ MAXRFI

35

.929

19.6

.86

35

.919

4.0

.94

35

.99

3.6

.97

32

.77

21.6

.69

30

.87

15

.70

3

.33

3.96

.13

3

.33

9.7

.13

While not “strong” rules, their high lift values indicate to an analyst that the co-occurrences
are related. In a subset of attack episodes within a single attack speed the final two rules
in Table 4.2 can be found. Signature “IISACC” describes the external access of files in the
root directory of a Microsoft IIS server. The signature “MAXRFI” describes a code injection
attack against a PHP server. These additional rules indicate that not every team is carrying
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out identical attacks, with some targeting more services than others. Figure 4.10 shows the
average temporal characteristics of these relationships exhibited across all teams and members.
Regardless of the additional actions taken by specific team members, the strong relationship
between “KOERFI” and “SMFRFI” is maintained.

Figure 4.10: Average timeline of critical and co-occurring signatures within the network
Presented with these timelines and signature relationships certain potential vulnerabilities or
attack channels within a network may be revealed to an analyst. While strong rules provide
an analyst insights into a signature relationship within a specific attack speed, the additional
metrics and rules help give a full context to a specific critical signature within an entire network.
Additional rule explorations can highlight variations in attacker actions surrounding the strong
relationships found.

4.4.3

R-CAD and RSOC

In a live environment experiencing low unique signatures per stream R-CAD is still able to
find strong rules at specific attack speeds for some critical signatures using both external
autonomous system number (ASN) and internal IP stream configurations. Each configuration produced strong rules for unique pairs of critical signatures. When processing streams
based on external ASN a number of strong rules were found pertaining to the critical signature “LINKSYS WORM” which describes a worm exploit that targets and propagates between
Linksys brand routers within a network. The co-occurring signature “LINKSYS RCE” highlighted in Figure 4.11 alerts to a malicious attempt to remotely execute code on a Linksys
device. It is possible that a router within the network was compromised and an attacker was
attempting to extend their reach to another device. This relationship was not found by R-CAD
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using internal IP streams. As the target device was a router and the relationship had a temporal
distance of nearly 50 seconds it is likely that many other alert signatures were generated for
this IP causing episodes at much higher attack speeds. In a live environment there may not be
a one size fits all approach for stream generation due to special cases such as this.

Figure 4.11:

Radar chart describing relationship between “LINKSYS WORM” and

“LINKSYS RCE”
Interestingly, attacks against the Linksys devices are preceded by an attacker bypassing authentication credentials to an IP webcam as shown in Figure 4.12. The co-occcurring signature
was more commonly seen in episodes with the critical one than even the other Linksys specific
signatures. This seemingly unrelated signature’s occurrence is strongly correlated to the critical signature. This strong rule alerts an analyst to a potential non-intuitive avenue of attack
against their router devices.

4.4.4

Persistent Relationships

When processing streams based on internal IPs strong rules were found describing relationships
between three signatures all describing attacks against Cold Fusion servers. The “CFADMN”
critical signature was present in both datasets, as were the strong rules and co-occurring signatures. Figure 4.13 illustrates the co-occurrences and timing for signatures related to CFADMN
in both datasets. While all three “CF” signatures describe attacks against cold fusion servers,
they are against unique components rather than all part of a single exploit. The CPTC dataset
contains an additional co-occurring signature “CFPWDA” which is not present in RSOC. This
signature describes a long patched exploit which can access and replay hashed credentials to gain
access to the server. Additionally, while the same signatures and co-occurrences were found, the
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Radar chart describing relationship between “LINKSYS WORM” and

“CAM ACC”

order in which they occur differs across datasets. This could be due to different scripts being
executed, or attackers manually levying the same attacks in a different order.

Figure 4.13: Timing illustration of Cold Fusion and co-signatures in RSOC (top) and CPTC
(bot)
In the RSOC dataset these relationships were found on three separate days of operation. Each
day R-CAD found the same rules occurring at similar attack speeds. In the external ASN stream
49.25𝑠

configuration the rule 𝐿𝐼 𝑁𝐾𝑆𝑌 𝑆 𝑊𝑂𝑅𝑀 −−−−−→ 𝑊𝐺𝐸𝑇 𝐻𝑇𝑇 𝑃 was also found during two separate days of operation. Encountering the same relationships across multiple days can strengthen
confidence in a less intuitive relationship and inform analysts that some vulnerabilities may still
exist within the network.
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Importance of Temporal Processing

By finding rules based on attack speed, it is possible to signature relationships unique to specific
attack speeds. When looking at the attack speeds for the signature “CDERED” shown in Figure
4.14 an analyst notices that individual external sources seem to be leveraging this particular
critical signature in two distinct and highly varied attack speeds. The CDERED signature
alerts analysts to the potential presence of the malicious Code Red worm which has been used
to target Microsoft IIS servers.

Figure 4.14: Individual concepts learned by CLEAR containing “CDERED” signature
Analysis of the CDERED signature shows two sets of co-occurring signatures that match to
the two attack speeds. CDERED co-occurs with“ROOTA,” “MSAAC” and “ISAPIA” in mere
milliseconds, while “JEXBO” and “DTLEAK” co-occur with half a minute between them.
The first group of signatures describe IIS server accesses. As the CDERED worm targets IIS
servers, it is intuitive that other IIS related signatures would co-occur. Once access to the server
is made the worm can be deployed. The ISAPIA signature alerts to a successful buffer overflow
on a IIS server providing further evidence of the worm’s deployment.
The second group of signatures seem to be enacting a very different action against a different
type of device within the network. The JEXBO signature refers to Jexboss, a tool used to test
Java platforms. It has been used as an attack vector in the “SamSam” ransomware attacks. A
similar approach may have been used here to deploy an exploit that behaves similarly to the
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CDERED worm, causing the alert. This is followed by the DTLEAK signature which alerts to
a potential leak of data out of the network.
Figure 4.15 shows the two groups of co-occurring signatures and their timing. Without this
timing information and the strong rules an analyst may not have been able to detect the second
group of relationships to the CDERED critical signature.

Figure 4.15: Timing illustration of unique signature co-occurrences related to Code Red
The additional metrics measured for strong rules provide more context to critical alerts. Analysts can at a glance ascertain deeper insights into a specific critical signature’s overall use
within a network thanks to the radar charts illustrating the metrics. This can even lead to the
discovery of relationships between non-obvious pairs of signatures.

4.5

Conclusion and Future Work

The R-CAD system’s novel approach to alert aggregation finds alert episodes occurring at
the same attack speeds to find the distinct timing patterns within a network. It can quickly
parse and present analysts with relevant information that they would not be able to manually
obtain. It requires no training data and can be run in near real-time. Episodes within an attack
speed can be processed quickly using pattern mining techniques thanks to its constrained SDB
construction which only processes sequences containing critical signatures.
High Lift and 𝛼 𝑥 indicate the strength of a found relationship, while additional metrics can be
used to quickly extract and represent further relevant insight into a critical signature. R-CAD
was able to find meaningful intuitive relationships in both the CPTC and RSOC datasets.
Analysts can quickly get an overview of a large set of critical signatures, and then hone in
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on specific ones exhibiting strong relationships. In some cases strong relationships were found
between two critical signatures. Some relationships were found across both datasets and across
multiple days within the real world RSOC dataset. Thanks to its focus on timing, critical
signatures operating in multiple “modes” can be found and clearly presented as well, potentially
revealing new and unintuitive signature relationships.
Future work advancing the R-CAD system should focus on leveraging found relationships in
episode processing. CLEAR’s learning engine already attempts to bolster aggregation by applying historic arrival statistics to incoming data. Expanding CLEAR’s processing to consider
alert signatures could allow it to quickly react to specific signatures that exhibit consistent
temporal behaviors. R-CAD can also be applied to other event driven contexts where there
is no clear knowledge of relationships across event attributes. Deeper knowledge of potential
attacker actions and the alerts they generate would give stronger confidence in R-CAD’s results. The curation of a dataset labeling actions and generated signatures would provide a set
of “expected” strong rules.

Chapter 5

Conclusion
R-CAD is a unique work in the overall literature focusing on assisting analysts in understanding
behavior in their own network. Insight into cyber behavior and relationships is presented in
ways that are meaningful to an analyst. The problem of extracting signature relationships is
difficult due to a lack of ground truth, and a lack of datasets which explicitly detail attacker
actions. In spite of these limitations this work shows the depth of information that can be
extracted from cyber data.
Initial exploration into the temporal characteristics of events showed that there is a temporal
dependence across periods of attacker activity. These trends can be modeled using traditional
forecasting approaches like ARIMA with regressors to predict future intensity. While predicting
specific cyber events in a timely manner is difficult due to a reliance on analyst produced datasets
the findings of the initial exploration produced the motivation for the rest of this work. Although
the rest of this worked moved away from forecasting methods, there is room for future work in
this area. Temporal regressors improving forecast accuracy show that time of day and day of
week can affect attack intensity. Additional attributes such as time of year, or historic attack
counts of other types could further improve modeling and forecast accuracy. More advanced
modeling methods, such as convolutional neural networks could also better model trends in the
datasets.
The CLEAR system can quickly process and aggregate cyber alerts in near real time and without
external training data. It’s novel concept learning mechanism allows it to more quickly adapt
to new arrivals. CLEAR produces less variant and more statistically unique concepts compared
to similar concept drift approaches. CLEAR’s design allows it to process any event stream.
Through a research collaboration with a non-cyber partner, CLEAR was able to effectively
process other types of event data and reveal insights into timing patterns within. Further
research effort in understanding the temporal nature of alerts could lead to further parameter
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tuning within CLEAR to improve aggregation. Similarly, the expansion of CLEAR to consider
additional alert features could provide smarter aggregation. These additional features could be
numerical or categorical. Capturing the ports or IPs not tied to the stream to an aggregate
may reveal further insights into attacker actions and patterns. Given the temporal patterns
found in cyber attack events by this work, it is possible that similar patterns exist in the
temporal concepts of alerts. Application of Markov models, or similar approaches, may reveal
patterns in the concepts of successive aggregates, allowing for future aggregate speed prediction.
Unlike the CPTC dataset, the real world streams had very different characteristics. Individual
IPs would generate a smaller number of alerts with fewer unique signatures. This lead to
shorter aggregates, and inherently limits the potential number of rules found by R-CAD. While
ASNs could be used in place of IP addresses to allow for more robust streams, the issue of
short aggregates persisted. Adaption of a control chart built around something other than the
EWMA could be better suited to cyber alert processing, though more research is required to
investigate potential alternatives.
R-CAD leverages CLEAR’s aggregation to collect attack episodes and learn network wide “attack speeds.” Pattern mining applied to episodes within attack speeds produces statistically
“strong” co-occurrences between the rare “critical” signatures analysts are interested in. Applied to real world SOC datasets, R-CAD is still able to find intuitive and meaningful relationships. Future work for R-CAD can continue to expand on the idea of providing predictive
and preventative insights to analysts. Feedback of signature timing patterns and co-occurrence
relationships to CLEAR could add an additional feature to aggregation, as well as a predictive
element to the system’s output. When CLEAR detects specific critical alerts a warning could
be raised to the analyst that draws on the known relationships found by R-CAD. Additional
system configurations could allow an analyst to set an automated network response to specific
found relationships that triggers at the detection of the critical or co-occurring signature. A
curated dataset with alerts labeled by the action used to generate them could also be created.
R-CAD’s ability to detect “known” relationships described by such a dataset could lead to further system improvement and optimization. Additional metrics could also be investigated to
add more robustness to the meaning of the strong rules found by R-CAD.
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[50] J. Smieško and J. Uramova. One-parameter methods for recognizing ddos attacks. In
2020 18th International Conference on Emerging eLearning Technologies and Applications
(ICETA), pages 628–633. IEEE, 2020.
[51] R. Smith, N. Japkowicz, and M. Dondo. Clustering using an autoassociator: A case study
in network event correlation. In IASTED PDCS, pages 613–618, 2005.
[52] J. Sun, L. Gu, et al. An efficient alert aggregation method based on conditional rough
entropy and knowledge granularity. Entropy, 22(3):324, 2020.
[53] Suricata. Suricata open source ids, 2020. https://suricata-ids.org/.
[54] Symantec. Symantec 2017 internet security threat report, 2017. https://docs.broadcom.
com/doc/istr-22-2017-en.
[55] J.J. Treinen and R Thurimella. A framework for the application of association rule mining
in large intrusion detection infrastructures. In International Workshop on Recent Advances
in Intrusion Detection, pages 1–18. Springer, 2006.
[56] Fredrik Valeur, Giovanni Vigna, Christopher Kruegel, and Richard A Kemmerer. Comprehensive approach to intrusion detection alert correlation. IEEE Transactions on Dependable
and Secure Computing, 1(3):146–169, 2004.
[57] P. Vaz de Melo, C. Faloutsos, R. Assunção, and A. Loureiro. The self-feeding process:
a unifying model for communication dynamics in the web. In Proceedings of the 22nd
international conference on World Wide Web, pages 1319–1330. ACM, 2013.
[58] J. Viinikka, H. Debar, L. Me, A. Lehikoinen, and M. Tarvainen. Processing intrusion
detection alert aggregates with time series modeling. Information Fusion, 10(4):312–324,
2009.
[59] Jouni Viinikka, Herve Debar, Ludovic Me, and Renaud Seguier. Time series modeling
for ids alert management. In Proceedings of the 2006 ACM Symposium on Information,
computer and communications security, pages 102–113, 2006.
[60] H. Wang and Z. Abraham. Concept drift detection for streaming data. In 2015 International
Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN), pages 1–9. IEEE, 2015.
[61] T. Wen and R. Keyes. Time series anomaly detection using convolutional neural networks
and transfer learning. CoRR, abs/1905.13628, 2019.
[62] G. Werner, A. Okutan, S. Yang, and K. McConky. Forecasting cyberattacks as time
series with different aggregation granularity. In 2018 IEEE International Symposium on
Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), pages 1–7. IEEE, 2018.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

83

[63] G. Werner, S. Yang, and K. McConky. Time series forecasting of cyber attack intensity. In
Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference on Cyber and Information Security Research,
CISRC ’17, pages 18:1–18:3, New York, NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[64] G. Werner, S. Yang, and K. McConky. Leveraging intra-day temporal variations to predict
daily cyberattack activity. In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and
Security Informatics (ISI), pages 58–63. IEEE, 2018.
[65] G. Werner, S. Yang, and K. McConky. Near real-time intrusion alert aggregation using concept-based learning. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM International Conference on
Computing Frontiers. ACM, 2021.
[66] D. Williams. Collegiate cyber defense competition, 2018. https://www.nationalccdc.
org/.
[67] Shelly Xiaonan Wu and Wolfgang Banzhaf. The use of computational intelligence in intrusion detection systems: A review. Applied Soft Computing, 10(1):1–35, 2010.
[68] S. Yang, H. Du, J. Holsopple, and M. Sudit. Attack projection. In A. Kott, C. Wang, and
R. Erbacher, editors, Cyber Defense and Situational Awareness, pages 239–261. Springer
International Publishing, Cham, 2014.
[69] M. Zaki. Sequence mining in categorical domains: incorporating constraints. In Proceedings
of the ninth international conference on Information and knowledge management, pages
422–429, 2000.
[70] Z. Zhan, M. Xu, and S. Xu. Characterizing honeypot-captured cyber attacks: Statistical
framework and case study. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
8(11):1775–1789, 2013.
[71] Z. Zhan, M. Xu, and S. Xu. Predicting cyber attack rates with extreme values. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 10(8):1666–1677, 2015.
[72] Q. Zheng, Y. Guang Xuan, and Wei H. H. An ids alert aggregation method based on
clustering. In Advanced Materials Research, volume 219, pages 156–159. Trans Tech Publ,
2011.
[73] Bin Zhu and Ali A Ghorbani. Alert correlation for extracting attack strategies. IJ Network
Security, 3(3):244–258, 2006.

Appendices

84

Appendix A

First Appendix
A.1

Term

Glossary of terms
Table A.1: Table of signature names and abbreviations in alphabetical order
Description

Aggregate

Group of temporally near and similar alerts

Alert

Generated by IDS to warn of potentially malicious traffic

Alert Group

Set of alerts with identical timestamps

Attack Speed

Collection of statistically similar concepts from all streams

Concept

Collection of aggregates which are statistically similar

Co-occurrence

two alerts found together in the same episodes

Critical Signature

Signature representing severe threat to a network

Episode

Aggregate of alerts with similar temporal arrival speed

Signature

Alert attribute. Describes traffic which triggered alert

Stream

Series of events, usually defined by alert IP address

Strong Rule

Association rule mined by R-CAD with high lift and critical confidence

A.2

Table of signatures and abbreviations
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Table A.2: Table of signature names and abbreviations in alphabetical order
Signature Abbr.
Full Signature
ACHIEVO RFI
ADOBE RFI

ET WEB SPECIFIC APPS Achievo debugger.php config atkroot
parameter Remote File Inclusion Attempt
PHPOF DB AdoDB.Class.PHP PHPOF INCLUDE PATH parameter
Remote File Inclusion

CAM ACC

ETPRO EXPLOIT WIFICAM Cameras .ini Unauthenticated Access Attempt

CFADMIN

ET WEB SERVER ColdFusion administrator access

CFAPI

ET WEB SERVER ColdFusion adminapi access

CFPWDA

ET WEB SERVER ColdFusion password.properties access

CFUTIL

ET WEB SERVER ColdFusion componentutils access

CHTRFI
IISACC
KOERFI

ET WEB SPECIFIC APPS Joomla AjaxChat Component ajcuser.php GLOBALS
Parameter Remote File Inclusion Attempt
GPL EXPLOIT iissamples access
ET WEB SPECIFIC APPS Possible Mambo/Joomla! com koesubmit Component
’koesubmit.php’ Remote File Inclusion Attempt

LINKSYS RCE

ET EXPLOIT Linksys E-Series Device RCE Attempt

LINKSYS WORM

ET WORM TheMoon.linksys.router 2

MAXRFI
PHPINJ
SMFRFI
SKEL RFI
TECH RFI

ET WEB SPECIFIC APPS MAXcms fm includes special Parameter
Remote File Inclusion Attempt
ET WEB SERVER Exploit Suspected PHP Injection Attack (cmd=)
ET WEB SPECIFIC APPS Mambo Component com smf smf.php Remote
File Inclusion Attempt
ET WEB SPECIFIC APPS phpSkelSite theme parameter remote file inclusion
ET WEB SPECIFIC APPS TECHNOTE shop this skin path Parameter
Remote File Inclusion

